Eric Zwick

Lessons from the Biggest Business Tax Cut in Us History
Date Posted:Tue, 16 Jul 2024 12:17:04 -0500
We assess the business provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the biggest corporate tax cut in US history. We draw five lessons. First, corporate tax revenue fell by 40 percent due to the lower rate and more generous expensing. Second, firms with larger declines in their effective tax wedge increased investment relatively more. In aggregate, we suggest a loose consensus from the literature that total tangible corporate investment increased by 11 percent. Third, the business tax provisions increased economic growth and wages by less than advertised by the Act?s proponents, with long-run GDP higher by less than 1% and labor income by less than $1,000 per employee. Fourth, provisions that increase foreign investment by US-based multinationals also boost their domestic operations. Fifth, some of the expired and expiring provisions, such as accelerated depreciation, generate more investment per dollar of tax revenue than others.

Lessons from the Biggest Business Tax Cut in Us History
Date Posted:Mon, 15 Jul 2024 13:42:40 -0500
We assess the business provisions of the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the biggest corporate tax cut in US history. We draw five lessons. First, corporate tax revenue fell by 40 percent due to the lower rate and more generous expensing. Second, firms with larger declines in their effective tax wedge increased investment relatively more. In aggregate, we suggest a loose consensus from the literature that total tangible corporate investment increased by 11 percent. Third, the business tax provisions increased economic growth and wages by less than advertised by the Act?s proponents, with long-run GDP higher by less than 1% and labor income by less than $1,000 per employee. Fourth, provisions that increase foreign investment by US-based multinationals also boost their domestic operations. Fifth, some of the expired and expiring provisions, such as accelerated depreciation, generate more investment per dollar of tax revenue than others.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Tax Policy and Investment in a Global Economy
Date Posted:Tue, 05 Mar 2024 12:08:44 -0600
We evaluate the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Combining reduced-form estimates from tax data with a global investment model, we estimate responses, identify parameters, and conduct counterfactuals. Domestic investment of firms with the mean tax change increases 20% versus a no-change baseline. Due to novel foreign incentives, foreign capital of U.S. multinationals rises substantially. These incentives also boost domestic investment, indicating complementarity between domestic and foreign capital. In the model, the long-run effect on domestic capital in general equilibrium is 7% and the tax revenue feedback from growth offsets only 2p.p. of the direct cost of 41% of pre-TCJA corporate revenue.

Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

Tax Policy and Investment in a Global Economy
Date Posted:Fri, 03 Nov 2023 18:53:03 -0500
We evaluate the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. Combining reduced-form estimates from tax data with a global investment model, we estimate responses, identify parameters, and conduct counterfactuals. Domestic investment of firms with the mean tax change increases 20% versus a no-change baseline. Due to novel foreign incentives, foreign capital of U.S. multinationals rises substantially. These incentives also boost domestic investment, indicating complementarity between domestic and foreign capital. In the model, the long-run effect on domestic capital in general equilibrium is 7% and the tax revenue feedback from growth offsets only 2p.p. of the direct cost of 41% of pre-TCJA corporate revenue.

The Health Wedge and Labor Market Inequality
Date Posted:Wed, 05 Apr 2023 18:27:10 -0500
Over half of the U.S. population receives health insurance through an employer, with employer premium contributions creating a flat "head tax" per worker, independent of their earnings. This paper develops and calibrates a stylized model of the labor market to explore how this uniquely American approach to financing health insurance contributes to labor market inequality. We consider a partial-equilibrium counterfactual in which employer-provided health insurance is instead financed by a statutory payroll tax on firms. We find that, under this counterfactual financing, in 2019 the college wage premium would have been 11 percent lower, non-college annual earnings would have been $1,700 (3 percent) higher, and non-college employment would have been nearly 500,000 higher. These calibrated labor market effects of switching from head-tax to payroll-tax financing are in the same ballpark as estimates of the impact of other leading drivers of labor market inequality, including changes in outsourcing, robot adoption, rising trade, unionization, and the real minimum wage. We also consider a separate partial-equilibrium counterfactual in which the current head-tax financing is maintained, but 2019 U.S. health care spending as a share of GDP is reduced to the Canadian share; here, we estimate that the 2019 college wage premium would have been 5 percent lower and non-college annual earnings would have been 5 percent higher. These findings suggest that health care costs and the financing

The Health Wedge and Labor Market Inequality
Date Posted:Mon, 03 Apr 2023 04:19:54 -0500
Over half of the U.S. population receives health insurance through an employer, with employer premium contributions creating a flat "head tax" per worker, independent of their earnings. This paper develops and calibrates a stylized model of the labor market to explore how this uniquely American approach to financing health insurance contributes to labor market inequality. We consider a partial-equilibrium counterfactual in which employer-provided health insurance is instead financed by a statutory payroll tax on firms. We find that, under this counterfactual financing, in 2019 the college wage premium would have been 11 percent lower, non-college annual earnings would have been $1,700 (3 percent) higher, and non-college employment would have been nearly 500,000 higher. These calibrated labor market effects of switching from head-tax to payroll-tax financing are in the same ballpark as estimates of the impact of other leading drivers of labor market inequality, including changes in outsourcing, robot adoption, rising trade, unionization, and the real minimum wage. We also consider a separate partial-equilibrium counterfactual in which the current head-tax financing is maintained, but 2019 U.S. health care spending as a share of GDP is reduced to the Canadian share; here, we estimate that the 2019 college wage premium would have been 5 percent lower and non-college annual earnings would have been 5 percent higher. These findings suggest that health care costs and the financing

Business Continuity Insurance in the Next Disaster
Date Posted:Mon, 06 Dec 2021 03:44:38 -0600
This article draws lessons from the business support policies pursued in the COVID-19 pandemic to guide policy design for the next disaster. We contrast the performance of the Paycheck Protection Program to the Main Street Lending Program to illustrate how design principles?targeting, repayment terms, and deployment through the banks versus government agencies?affect policy outcomes. We develop a framework for understanding why a novel business support policy could usefully complement traditional support programs. One surprising insight that emerges from this analysis is that many of the market failures used to justify support during the pandemic also arise in ?garden-variety? recessions. Given our framework, the policy case for small business support during the recovery is considerably weaker than during the disaster, though credit policies that promote firm entry could aid the reallocation process.

The Rise of Pass-Throughs and the Decline of the Labor Share
Date Posted:Mon, 01 Nov 2021 21:02:14 -0500
This paper studies the coevolution of the fall in the US corporate sector labor share and the rise of business activity in tax-preferred, pass-through form. Reallocating activity to the form it would have taken prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 accounts for one third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share between 1978 and 2017. Our adjustments are concentrated among mid-market firms in services, leaving a larger role for the manufacturing sector and superstar firms in driving the remaining decline in the labor share. Our findings highlight the importance of tax policy when measuring factor shares.

New: The Rise of Pass-Throughs and the Decline of the Labor Share
Date Posted:Mon, 01 Nov 2021 12:07:53 -0500
This paper studies the coevolution of the fall in the US corporate sector labor share and the rise of business activity in tax-preferred, pass-through form. Reallocating activity to the form it would have taken prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 accounts for one third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share between 1978 and 2017. Our adjustments are concentrated among mid-market firms in services, leaving a larger role for the manufacturing sector and superstar firms in driving the remaining decline in the labor share. Our findings highlight the importance of tax policy when measuring factor shares.

The Rise of Pass-Throughs and the Decline of the Labor Share
Date Posted:Mon, 25 Oct 2021 05:22:10 -0500
This paper studies the coevolution of the fall in the US corporate sector labor share and the rise of business activity in tax-preferred, pass-through form. Reallocating activity to the form it would have taken prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 accounts for one third of the decline in the corporate sector labor share between 1978 and 2017. Our adjustments are concentrated among mid-market firms in services, leaving a larger role for the manufacturing sector and superstar firms in driving the remaining decline in the labor share. Our findings highlight the importance of tax policy when measuring factor shares.

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich
Date Posted:Wed, 20 Oct 2021 17:48:39 -0500
This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that links people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. Disaggregated fixed income data reveal that rich individuals earn much more of their interest income in higher-yielding forms, and have much greater exposure to credit risk. Consequently, in recent years, the interest rate on fixed income at the top is approximately three times higher than the average. Using firm-level characteristics to value firms, we find that twenty percent of total pass-through business wealth accrues to those with losses. We combine this new data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C-corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates. Our approach---which builds on Saez and Zucman (2016) and Bricker, Henriques, and Hansen (2018)---reduces bias because wealth and rates of return are correlated. From 1989 to 2016, the top 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01% wealth shares increased by 7.6, 5.1, and 3.0 percentage points, respectively, to 31.5%, 15.0%, and 7.0%. While these changes are less dramatic than some prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as either the bottom 90% or the "P90-99" class. We discuss implications for income inequality measures, capital tax policy, and savings behavior.

New: Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich
Date Posted:Wed, 20 Oct 2021 08:54:11 -0500
This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that links people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. Disaggregated fixed income data reveal that rich individuals earn much more of their interest income in higher-yielding forms, and have much greater exposure to credit risk. Consequently, in recent years, the interest rate on fixed income at the top is approximately three times higher than the average. Using firm-level characteristics to value firms, we find that twenty percent of total pass-through business wealth accrues to those with losses. We combine this new data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C-corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates. Our approach---which builds on Saez and Zucman (2016) and Bricker, Henriques, and Hansen ...

Top Wealth in America: New Estimates and Implications for Taxing the Rich
Date Posted:Mon, 18 Oct 2021 05:22:01 -0500
This paper uses administrative tax data to estimate top wealth in the United States. We assemble new data that links people to their sources of capital income and develop new methods to estimate the degree of return heterogeneity within asset classes. Disaggregated fixed income data reveal that rich individuals earn much more of their interest income in higher-yielding forms, and have much greater exposure to credit risk. Consequently, in recent years, the interest rate on fixed income at the top is approximately three times higher than the average. Using firm-level characteristics to value firms, we find that twenty percent of total pass-through business wealth accrues to those with losses. We combine this new data on fixed income and pass-through business returns with refined estimates of C-corporation equity, housing, and pension wealth to deliver new capitalized wealth estimates. Our approach---which builds on Saez and Zucman (2016) and Bricker, Henriques, and Hansen (2018)---reduces bias because wealth and rates of return are correlated. From 1989 to 2016, the top 1%, 0.1%, and 0.01% wealth shares increased by 7.6, 5.1, and 3.0 percentage points, respectively, to 31.5%, 15.0%, and 7.0%. While these changes are less dramatic than some prior estimates, wealth is very concentrated: the top 1% holds nearly as much wealth as either the bottom 90% or the "P90-99" class. We discuss implications for income inequality measures, capital tax policy, and savings behavior.

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Mon, 27 Sep 2021 19:04:16 -0500
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to study the role of banks in explaining the employment effects of the PPP. We find the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program’s size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers which can account for ...

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Tue, 21 Sep 2021 21:58:14 -0500
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to study the role of banks in explaining the employment effects of the PPP. We find the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program's size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers, which can account for ...

REVISION: Rethinking How We Score Capital Gains Tax Reform
Date Posted:Wed, 03 Feb 2021 03:54:35 -0600
We argue the revenue potential from increasing tax rates on capital gains may be substantially greater than previously understood. First, many prior studies focus primarily on short-run taxpayer responses, and so miss revenue from gains that are deferred when rates change. Second, the composition of capital gains has shifted in recent years, such that the share of gains that are highly elastic to the tax rate has likely declined. Third, focusing on capital gains tax collection may understate fiscal spillovers from decreasing the preferential tax treatment for capital gains. Fourth, additional base-broadening reforms, like eliminating stepped-up basis and making charitable giving a realization event, will decrease the elasticity of the tax base to rate changes. Overall, we do not think the prevailing assumption of many in the scorekeeping community—that raising rates to top ordinary income levels would raise little revenue—is warranted. A crude calculation illustrates that raising ...

Rethinking How We Score Capital Gains Tax Reform
Date Posted:Wed, 27 Jan 2021 11:33:23 -0600
We argue the revenue potential from increasing tax rates on capital gains may be substantially greater than previously understood. First, many prior studies focus primarily on short-run taxpayer responses, and so miss revenue from gains that are deferred when rates change. Second, the composition of capital gains has shifted in recent years, such that the share of gains that are highly elastic to the tax rate has likely declined. Third, focusing on capital gains tax collection may understate fiscal spillovers from decreasing the preferential tax treatment for capital gains. Fourth, additional base-broadening reforms, like eliminating stepped-up basis and making charitable giving a realization event, will decrease the elasticity of the tax base to rate changes. Overall, we do not think the prevailing assumption of many in the scorekeeping community?that raising rates to top ordinary income levels would raise little revenue?is warranted. A crude calculation illustrates that raising capital gains rates to ordinary income levels could raise $1 trillion more revenue over a decade than other estimates suggest. Given the magnitudes at stake, scorekeeping procedures employed in evaluating capital gains should be made more transparent and be the subject of external professional debate and review.

Rethinking How We Score Capital Gains Tax Reform
Date Posted:Mon, 25 Jan 2021 19:13:06 -0600
We argue the revenue potential from increasing tax rates on capital gains may be substantially greater than previously understood. First, many prior studies focus primarily on short-run taxpayer responses, and so miss revenue from gains that are deferred when rates change. Second, the composition of capital gains has shifted in recent years, such that the share of gains that are highly elastic to the tax rate has likely declined. Third, focusing on capital gains tax collection may understate fiscal spillovers from decreasing the preferential tax treatment for capital gains. Fourth, additional base-broadening reforms, like eliminating stepped-up basis and making charitable giving a realization event, will decrease the elasticity of the tax base to rate changes. Overall, we do not think the prevailing assumption of many in the scorekeeping community?that raising rates to top ordinary income levels would raise little revenue?is warranted. A crude calculation illustrates that raising capital gains rates to ordinary income levels could raise $1 trillion more revenue over a decade than other estimates suggest. Given the magnitudes at stake, scorekeeping procedures employed in evaluating capital gains should be made more transparent and be the subject of external professional debate and review.

REVISION: Rethinking How We Score Capital Gains Tax Reform
Date Posted:Mon, 25 Jan 2021 09:15:58 -0600
We argue the revenue potential from increasing tax rates on capital gains may be substantially greater than previously understood. First, many prior studies focus primarily on short-run taxpayer responses, and so miss revenue from gains that are deferred when rates change. Second, the composition of capital gains has shifted in recent years, such that the share of gains that are highly elastic to the tax rate has likely declined. Third, focusing on capital gains tax collection may understate fiscal spillovers from decreasing the preferential tax treatment for capital gains. Fourth, additional base-broadening reforms, like eliminating stepped-up basis and making charitable giving a realization event, will decrease the elasticity of the tax base to rate changes. Overall, we do not think the prevailing assumption of many in the scorekeeping community—that raising rates to top ordinary income levels would raise little revenue—is warranted. A crude calculation illustrates that raising ...

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Tue, 17 Nov 2020 02:39:25 -0600
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially ?owed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to show that the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program’s size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers, which can account for small employment effects and likely reflects precautionary motives in the ...

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Thu, 15 Oct 2020 02:59:50 -0500
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans in the first round of funding. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to show that the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program’s size. Third, many firms used the loans to ...

Business Incomes at the Top
Date Posted:Fri, 04 Sep 2020 15:13:06 -0500
Business income constitutes a large and increasing share of income and wealth at the top of the distribution. We discuss how tax policy treats and shapes how businesses are organized and how they distribute economic gains to owners, with the focus on closely-held and pass-through firms. These considerations influence whether and how labor and capital income is observed in economic data and feed into research controversies regarding the measurement of inequality and the progressivity of the tax code. We discuss the importance of these issues in the US, and highlight that limited evidence from other countries suggests that they are likely to be important elsewhere.

New: Business Incomes at the Top
Date Posted:Fri, 04 Sep 2020 06:14:15 -0500
Business income constitutes a large and increasing share of income and wealth at the top of the distribution. We discuss how tax policy treats and shapes how businesses are organized and how they distribute economic gains to owners, with the focus on closely-held and pass-through firms. These considerations influence whether and how labor and capital income is observed in economic data and feed into research controversies regarding the measurement of inequality and the progressivity of the tax code. We discuss the importance of these issues in the US, and highlight that limited evidence from other countries suggests that they are likely to be important elsewhere.

Business Incomes at the Top
Date Posted:Mon, 31 Aug 2020 15:05:15 -0500
Business income constitutes a large and increasing share of income and wealth at the top of the distribution. We discuss how tax policy treats and shapes how businesses are organized and how they distribute economic gains to owners, with the focus on closely-held and pass-through firms. These considerations influence whether and how labor and capital income is observed in economic data and feed into research controversies regarding the measurement of inequality and the progressivity of the tax code. We discuss the importance of these issues in the US, and highlight that limited evidence from other countries suggests that they are likely to be important elsewhere.

Is Attention Produced Rationally?
Date Posted:Tue, 07 Jul 2020 20:12:07 -0500
A large and growing literature shows that attention-increasing interventions, such as reminders and planning prompts, can promote important behaviors. This paper develops a method to investigate whether people value attention-increasing tools rationally. We characterize how the demand for attention improvements must vary with the pecuniary incentive to be attentive and develop quantitative tests of rational inattention that we deploy in two experiments. The first is an experiment with an online education platform run in the field (n=1,373), in which we randomize incentives to complete course modules and incentives to make plans to complete the modules. The second is an online survey-completion experiment (n=944), in which we randomize incentives to complete a survey three weeks later and the price of reminders to complete the survey. In both experiments, as incentives to complete a task increase, demand for attention-improving technologies also increases. However, our tests suggest that the increase in demand for attention improvements is too small relative to the null of full rationality, indicating that people underuse attention-increasing tools. In our second experiment, we estimate that individuals undervalue the benefits of reminders by 59%.

New: Is Attention Produced Rationally?
Date Posted:Tue, 07 Jul 2020 11:13:02 -0500
A large and growing literature shows that attention-increasing interventions, such as reminders and planning prompts, can promote important behaviors. This paper develops a method to investigate whether people value attention-increasing tools rationally. We characterize how the demand for attention improvements must vary with the pecuniary incentive to be attentive and develop quantitative tests of rational inattention that we deploy in two experiments. The first is an experiment with an online education platform run in the field (n=1,373), in which we randomize incentives to complete course modules and incentives to make plans to complete the modules. The second is an online survey-completion experiment (n=944), in which we randomize incentives to complete a survey three weeks later and the price of reminders to complete the survey. In both experiments, as incentives to complete a task increase, demand for attention-improving technologies also increases. However, our tests suggest ...

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Tue, 07 Jul 2020 05:56:38 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of the first round of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds ?owed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds ?owed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans in the first round. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. We do not ...

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Tue, 07 Jul 2020 05:37:54 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of the first round of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds flowed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds flowed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans in the first round. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. We do ...

Is Attention Produced Optimally? Theory and Evidence from Experiments with Bandwidth Enhancements
Date Posted:Mon, 29 Jun 2020 14:30:16 -0500
This paper investigates whether people optimally value tools that reduce attention costs. We call these tools bandwidth enhancements (BEs) and characterize how demand for BEs varies with the pecuniary incentives to be attentive, under the null hypothesis of correct perceptions and optimal choice. We examine if the optimality conditions are satisfied in three experiments. The first is a field experiment (n = 1373) with an online education platform, in which we randomize incentives to complete course modules and incentives to utilize a plan-making tool to complete the modules. In the second experiment (n = 2306), participants must complete a survey in the future. We randomize survey-completion incentives and how long participants must wait to complete the survey, and we elicit willingness to pay for reminders. The third experiment (n = 1465) involves a psychometric task in which participants must identify whether there are more correct or incorrect mathematical equations in an image. We vary incentives for accuracy, elicit willingness to pay to reduce task difficulty, and examine the impact of learning and feedback. In all experiments, demand for reducing attention costs increases as incentives for accurate task completion increase. However, in all experiments?and across all conditions?our tests imply that this increase in demand is too small relative to the null of correct perceptions. These results suggest that people may be uncertain or systematically biased about their atte

Tax Policy and Abnormal Investment Behavior
Date Posted:Mon, 15 Jun 2020 18:27:12 -0500
This paper studies tax-minimizing investment, whereby firms tilt capital purchases toward fiscal year-end to reduce taxes. Between 1984 and 2016, average investment in fiscal Q4 exceeds the fiscal Q1 through Q3 average by 36%. Q4 spikes occur in the U.S. and internationally. We use this behavior to characterize the mechanisms through which taxes affect corporate investment behavior. Research designs using variation in firm tax positions from administrative data and tax policy changes confirm that tax minimization causes spikes. Spikes increase when firms face financial constraints or higher option values of waiting until fiscal year-end, and cumulative investment levels do not completely reverse after spikes. We develop an investmentmodel with tax asymmetries to rationalize these patterns. In themodel, both a depreciation motive?late-year investments face lower effective tax rates?and an option value motive?tax asymmetry implies time-varying opportunities to minimize taxes?are necessary to fit the data. We document and discuss implications of investment spikes for capital goods suppliers, lenders, and stimulus policy design.

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Mon, 11 May 2020 04:10:47 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds flowed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds flowed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. As data become available, we will study ...

Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Tue, 05 May 2020 10:05:54 -0500
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to study the role of banks in explaining the employment effects of the PPP. We find the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program?s size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers, which can account for small employment effects and likely reflects precautionary motives in the face of heightened uncertainty. Limited targeting in terms of who was eligible likely also led to many inframarginal firms receiving funds and to a low correlation between regional PPP funding and shock severity. Our findings illustrate how business liquidity support programs affect firm behavior and local economic activity, and how policy trans-mission depends on the agents delegated to deploy it.

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Wed, 29 Apr 2020 07:52:00 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds flowed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds flowed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. As data become available, we will study ...

Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Mon, 27 Apr 2020 20:45:56 -0500
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to study the role of banks in explaining the employment effects of the PPP. We find the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program?s size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers which can account for small employment effects and likely reflects precautionary motives in the face of heightened uncertainty. Limited targeting in terms of who was eligible likely also led to many inframarginal firms receiving funds and to a low correlation between regional PPP funding and shock severity. Our findings illustrate how business liquidity support programs affect firm behavior and local economic activity, and how policy transmission depends on the agents delegated to deploy it.

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Mon, 27 Apr 2020 11:45:56 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds flowed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds flowed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. As data become available, we will study ...

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Mon, 27 Apr 2020 04:41:18 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds flowed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds flowed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. As data become available, we will study ...

Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Sun, 26 Apr 2020 15:35:50 -0500
This paper provides a comprehensive assessment of financial intermediation and the economic effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic in the US. We use loan-level microdata for all PPP loans and high-frequency administrative employment data to present three main findings. First, banks played an important role in mediating program targeting, which helps explain why some funds initially flowed to regions that were less adversely affected by the pandemic. Second, we exploit regional heterogeneity in lending relationships and individual firm-loan matched data to study the role of banks in explaining the employment effects of the PPP. We find the short- and medium-term employment effects of the program were small compared to the program's size. Third, many firms used the loans to make non-payroll fixed payments and build up savings buffers, which can account for small employment effects and likely reflects precautionary motives in the face of heightened uncertainty. Limited targeting in terms of who was eligible likely also led to many inframarginal firms receiving funds and to a low correlation between regional PPP funding and shock severity. Our findings illustrate how business liquidity support programs affect firm behavior and local economic activity, and how policy transmission depends on the agents delegated to deploy it.

REVISION: Did the Paycheck Protection Program Hit the Target?
Date Posted:Sun, 26 Apr 2020 06:36:00 -0500
This paper takes an early look at the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP), a large and novel small business support program that was part of the initial policy response to the COVID-19 pandemic. We use new data on the distribution of PPP loans and high-frequency micro-level employment data to consider two dimensions of program targeting. First, we do not find evidence that funds flowed to areas more adversely affected by the economic effects of the pandemic, as measured by declines in hours worked or business shutdowns. If anything, funds flowed to areas less hard hit. Second, we find significant heterogeneity across banks in terms of disbursing PPP funds, which does not only reflect differences in underlying loan demand. The top-4 banks alone account for 36% of total pre-policy small business loans, but disbursed less than 3% of all PPP loans. Areas that were significantly more exposed to low-PPP banks received much lower loan allocations. As data become available, we will study ...

Capitalists in the Twenty-first Century
Date Posted:Sat, 23 Feb 2019 22:10:08 -0600
Have the idle rich replaced the working rich at the top of the U.S. income distribution? Using tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners, this paper finds that entrepreneurs who actively manage their firms are key for top income inequality. Most top income is non-wage income, a primary source of which is private business profit. These profits accrue to working-age owners of closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries. Private business profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Classifying three-quarters of private business profit as human capital income, we find that most top earners are working rich: they derive most of their income from human capital, not physical or financial capital. The human capital income of private business owners exceeds top wage income and top public equity income. Growth in private business profit is explained by both rising productivity and a rising share of value added accruing to owners.

New: Capitalists in the Twenty-first Century
Date Posted:Sat, 23 Feb 2019 12:11:28 -0600
Have the idle rich replaced the working rich at the top of the U.S. income distribution? Using tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners, this paper finds that entrepreneurs who actively manage their firms are key for top income inequality. Most top income is non-wage income, a primary source of which is private business profit. These profits accrue to working-age owners of closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries. Private business profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Classifying three-quarters of private business profit as human capital income, we find that most top earners are working rich: they derive most of their income from human capital, not physical or financial capital. The human capital income of private business owners exceeds top wage income and top public equity income. Growth in private business profit is explained by both rising productivity and a rising share of value added accruing to owners.

Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century
Date Posted:Tue, 15 Jan 2019 14:33:25 -0600
How important is human capital at the top of the U.S. income distribution? A primary source of top income is private ?pass-through? business profit, which can include entrepreneurial labor income for tax reasons. This paper asks whether top pass-through profit mostly reflects human capital, defined as all inalienable factors embodied in business owners, rather than financial capital. Tax data linking 11 million firms to their owners show that top pass-through profit accrues to working-age owners of closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries. Pass-through profit falls by three-quarters after owner retirement or premature death. Classifying three-quarters of pass-through profit as human capital income, we find that the typical top earner derives most of her income from human capital, not financial capital. Growth in pass-through profit is explained by both rising productivity and a rising share of value added accruing to owners.

REVISION: Kinky Tax Policy and Abnormal Investment Behavior
Date Posted:Thu, 10 May 2018 03:36:06 -0500
This paper documents tax-minimizing investment, in which firms accelerate capital purchases near fiscal year-end to reduce taxes. Between 1984 and 2013, average investment in fiscal Q4 exceeds the average of fiscal Q1 through Q3 by 37%. Q4 spikes occur in the U.S. and internationally. Research designs using variation in firm tax positions and the 1986 Tax Reform Act show that tax minimization causes spikes. Spikes increase when firms face financial constraints or higher option values of waiting. We develop an investment model with tax asymmetries to rationalize these patterns. Models without purchase-year, tax-minimization motives are unlikely to fit the data.

The Costs of Corporate Tax Complexity
Date Posted:Mon, 12 Mar 2018 10:54:59 -0500
Does tax code complexity alter corporate behavior? This paper investigates this question by focusing on the decision to claim refunds for tax losses. In a sample of 1.2M observations from the population of corporate tax returns, only 37% of eligible firms claim their refund. A simple cost-benefit analysis of the tax loss choice cannot explain low take-up, which motivates an investigation of how tax complexity alters this calculation. A research design exploiting tax preparer switches, deaths, and relocations shows that sophisticated preparers increase the claiming behavior of small and mid-market firms. Tax complexity decreases take-up among large firms through interactions of refund claims with other tax code provisions and with the audit process.

Speculative Dynamics of Prices and Volume
Date Posted:Tue, 30 May 2017 14:10:54 -0500
Using data on 50 million home sales from the last U.S. housing cycle, we document that much of the variation in volume came from the rise and fall in speculation. Cities with larger speculative booms have larger price booms, sharper increases in unsold listings as the market turns, and more severe busts. We present a model in which predictable price increases endogenously attract short-term buyers more than long-term buyers. Short-term buyers amplify volume by selling faster and destabilize prices through positive feedback. Our model matches key aggregate patterns, including the lead?lag price?volume relation and a sharp rise in inventories.

Arrested Development: Theory and Evidence of Supply-Side Speculation in the Housing Market
Date Posted:Wed, 11 Jan 2017 10:05:47 -0600
This paper studies the role of disagreement in amplifying housing cycles. Speculation is easier in the land market than in the housing market due to frictions that make renting less efficient than owner-occupancy. As a result, undeveloped land both facilitates construction and intensifies the speculation that causes booms and busts in house prices. This observation reverses the standard intuition that cities where construction is easier experience smaller house price booms. It also explains why the largest house price booms in the United States between 2000 and 2006 occurred in areas with elastic housing supply.

Stimulating Housing Markets
Date Posted:Mon, 12 Dec 2016 12:21:54 -0600
This paper studies temporary policy incentives designed to address capital overhang by inducing asset demand from buyers in the private market. Using variation across local geographies in ex ante program exposure and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the First-Time Homebuyer Credit induced a cumulative increase in home sales of 397 to 546 thousand, or 7.8 to 10.7 percent, nationally. We find little evidence of a sharp reversal of the policy response; instead, demand comes from several years in the future. The program likely sped the process of reallocating homes from distressed sellers to high value buyers, which stabilized house prices. The response is concentrated in the existing home sales market, implying the stimulative effects of the program were less important than its role in accelerating reallocation.

REVISION: Stimulating Housing Markets
Date Posted:Tue, 13 Sep 2016 15:52:23 -0500
This paper studies temporary policy incentives designed to address capital overhang by inducing asset demand from buyers in the private market. Using variation across local geographies in ex ante program exposure and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the First-Time Homebuyer Credit induced a cumulative increase in home sales of at least 382 thousand, or 7.4 percent, nationally. We find little evidence of a sharp reversal of the policy response; instead, demand appears to come from several years in the future. The program likely sped the process of reallocating homes from distressed sellers to high value buyers and stabilized house prices. The response is concentrated in the existing home sales market, implying the stimulative effects of the program were less important than its role in accelerating reallocation.

Stimulating Housing Markets
Date Posted:Fri, 19 Aug 2016 21:51:44 -0500
This paper studies temporary policy incentives designed to address capital overhang by inducing asset demand from buyers in the private market. Using variation across local geographies in ex ante program exposure and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the First-Time Homebuyer Credit induced a cumulative increase in home sales of at least 382 thousand, or 7.4 percent, nationally. We find little evidence of a sharp reversal of the policy response; instead, demand appears to come from several years in the future. The program likely sped the process of reallocating homes from distressed sellers to high value buyers and stabilized house prices. The response is concentrated in the existing home sales market, implying the stimulative effects of the program were less important than its role in accelerating reallocation.

REVISION: Stimulating Housing Markets
Date Posted:Fri, 19 Aug 2016 12:51:44 -0500
This paper studies temporary policy incentives designed to address capital overhang by inducing asset demand from buyers in the private market. Using variation across local geographies in ex ante program exposure and a difference-in-differences design, we find that the First-Time Homebuyer Credit induced a cumulative increase in home sales of at least 382 thousand, or 7.4 percent, nationally. We find little evidence of a sharp reversal of the policy response; instead, demand appears to come from several years in the future. The program likely sped the process of reallocating homes from distressed sellers to high value buyers and stabilized house prices. The response is concentrated in the existing home sales market, implying the stimulative effects of the program were less important than its role in accelerating reallocation.

Tax Policy and Heterogeneous Investment Behavior
Date Posted:Wed, 20 Jan 2016 10:08:08 -0600
We estimate the effect of temporary tax incentives on equipment investment using shifts in accelerated depreciation. Analyzing data for over 120,000 firms, we present three findings. First, bonus depreciation raised investment in eligible capital relative to ineligible capital by 10.4% between 2001 and 2004 and 16.9% between 2008 and 2010. Second, small firms respond 95% more than big firms. Third, firms respond strongly when the policy generates immediate cash flows but not when cash flows only come in the future. This heterogeneity materially affects aggregate estimates and supports models in which financial frictions or fixed costs amplify investment responses.

Business in the United States: Who Owns it and How Much Tax Do They Pay?
Date Posted:Mon, 26 Oct 2015 15:24:31 -0500
?Pass-through? businesses like partnerships and S-corporations now generate over half of U.S. business income and account for much of the post-1980 rise in the top- 1% income share. We use administrative tax data from 2011 to identify pass-through business owners and estimate how much tax they pay. We present three findings. (1) Relative to traditional business income, pass-through business income is substantially more concentrated among high-earners. (2) Partnership ownership is opaque: 20% of the income goes to unclassifiable partners, and 15% of the income is earned in circularly owned partnerships. (3) The average federal income tax rate on U.S. pass- through business income is 19%|much lower than the average rate on traditional corporations. If pass-through activity had remained at 1980's low level, strong but straightforward assumptions imply that the 2011 average U.S. tax rate on total U.S. business income would have been 28% rather than 24%, and tax revenue would have been approximately $100 billion higher.

Opting Out of Good Governance
Date Posted:Mon, 10 Mar 2014 10:05:20 -0500
Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange does not bond foreign firms to follow the corporate governance rules of that exchange. Hand-collected data show that 80% of cross-listed firms opt out of at least one exchange governance rule, instead committing to observe the rules of their home country. Relative to firms that comply, firms that opt out have weaker governance practices in that they have a smaller share of independent directors. The decision to opt out reflects the relative costs and benefits of doing so. Cross-listed firms opt out more when coming from countries with weak corporate governance rules, but if firms based in such countries are growing and have a need for external finance, they are more likely to comply. Finally, opting out affects the value of cash holdings. For cross-listed firms based in countries with weak governance rules, a dollar of cash held inside the firm is worth $1.52 if the firm fully complies with U.S. exchange rules but just $0.32 if it is non-compliant.