Rimmy E. Tomy’s research interests include financial reporting, bank accounting, regulation, and auditing. Her research focuses on the impact of regulatory intervention on firms' financial reporting and real activities, and the role of external monitors such as auditors and regulators in corporate oversight and governance.
Professor Tomy earned her Ph.D. in Accounting from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. She holds an MS in Accounting from the University of Colorado at Boulder, a post graduate diploma in Finance and Accounting from Xavier Institute of Management, and a BS from St. Stephen’s College, University of Delhi.
Outside of academia, Professor Tomy has previous corporate experience working at Ernst & Young LLP and McKinsey & Company.
2017 - 2018 Course Schedule
REVISION: Repatriation Taxes and Foreign Cash Holdings: The Impact of Anticipated Tax Policy
We examine whether anticipation of Congress enacting a reduction in repatriation taxes affects the amount of cash U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) hold overseas. Prior papers have focused on which U.S. MNCs repatriated foreign cash and how they deployed these funds following the repatriation tax holiday in 2004. We build on this literature and examine whether MNCs were willing to incur the costs of holding excess cash in response to proposed, but uncertain tax legislation. We find that U.S. MNCs most likely to benefit from this legislation began accumulating significant cash holdings once Congress initially proposed and began deliberating a second repatriation tax holiday. Further tests reveal that this cash accumulation was accompanied by two complementary activities designed to maximize expected tax benefits: tax-motivated income shifting and increases in permanently reinvested foreign earnings. The documentation of such preemptive behavior by corporations contributes to the ...
New: Competition and the Use of Discretion in Financial Reporting: Evidence from Community Banks
This paper examines how an increase in the threat of competition distorts firms' financial reporting. I consider two channels: actions taken by managers as well as by regulators.
Using state-level changes in branching regulation, I find that geographically-constrained community banks increased their loss provisions and appeared less profitable when faced with the threat of entry by competitors. Future losses do not justify the increase in provisions. The effect is consistent with both managers' and regulators' use of discretion in financial reporting, driven by managers' entry-deterrence objective and regulators' mandate to ensure safety and soundness of the financial system.
Survey-based evidence collected as part of this study supports the premise that banks prefer to locate in markets where incumbents have high profitability and low credit losses, and that banks use competitors' financial statements in analyzing their competition. Survey evidence also suggests that ...