Eric Budish researches auction and matching markets, and more broadly he is interested in the design of market institutions. His most recent work concerns the design of markets that allocate schedules of courses to students, or schedules of shifts to workers. Other past and ongoing research projects relate to the design of internet auctions, school choice procedures, markets for event tickets, business to business platforms, markets for innovation, and financial exchanges. Two theoretical topics of current interest are the use of randomness in market design, and notions of approximate incentives for truth telling in markets.
Budish teaches an MBA elective course on competitive strategy, and a PhD topics course on market design.
Budish received his PhD in Business Economics from Harvard University before joining Chicago Booth in 2009. He received a BA in Economics and Philosophy from Amherst College and an M.Phil. in Economics from Oxford (Nuffield College), where he was a Marshall Scholar. Prior to graduate school, Budish worked at Goldman Sachs as an analyst in the Mergers and Acquisitions group.
“The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes,” Journal of Political Economy Vol. 119(6), pp 1061-1103 (Dec 2011).
With Estelle Cantillon, “The Multi-Unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard,” American Economic Review (forthcoming).
With Abe Othman and Tuomas Sandholm, "Finding Approximate Competitive Equilibria: Efficient and Fair Course Allocation," Proc. of 9th Int. Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010).
With Yeon-Koo Che, Fuhito Kojima, and Paul Milgrom, “Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications" American Economic Review (forthcoming).
With Eduardo Azevedo, "Strategyproofness in the Large as a Desideratum for Market Design" (Working Paper).