Professor Myerson will discuss:
Moral Hazard Credit Cycles
The Lender of Last Resort
Asymmetric-Information / Adverse Selection
Regarding banking regulation:
Should any security be labeled "safe"(AAA rated mortgage backed securities, sovereign debt in the euro zone, etc.)?
Should Regulators use risk-weighted capital adequacy formulas, a bank's own risk models, or both?
What do citizens need to know about what accounting standards bank regulators should apply to ensure regulatory reforms are effective? How do we keep regulators accountable?
Should we elimate off balance sheet liabilities?
Why do banks have an incentive to use debt financing? Should we require equity financing?
What is the single most effective way to ensure that a bank's owners have an incentive to manage its risks prudently?
$7 in advance, $10 at door if available
6:00 PM-6:30 PM: Cocktail Reception
6:30 PM-7:30 PM: Myerson Presentation
7:30 PM-8:00 PM: Q & A
Roger B. Myerson (Speaker)
The David L. Pearson Distinguished Service Professor in Economics and the College, University of Chicago
Myerson is the author of Game Theory: Analysis and Conflict (1991).
Myerson won the 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in recognition of his contributions to mechanism design theory, which analyzes rules for coordinating economic agents efficiently when they have different information and difficulty trusting each other.
In game theory, Myerson introduced refinements of Nash's equilibrium concept, and he developed techniques to characterize the effects of communication among rational agents who have different information.
John Salvino, '06