The High Price of Cheaper Stock Trades
Cutting costs had a surprising effect for retail investors, particularly the least sophisticated ones.
- By
- February 02, 2026
- CBR - Finance
Cutting costs had a surprising effect for retail investors, particularly the least sophisticated ones.
It has never been cheaper or easier for individual investors to trade stocks. Over the past decade, commissions have dropped—in some cases to zero. The rise of commission-free digital trading collided with COVID-19 lockdown-induced boredom to help create a perfect storm of retail trading activity. Retail is now an estimated 20–30 percent of total US trading volume, up from about 10 percent in 2010, according to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association’s US Equity Market Structure Compendium, published in 2025.
Accessible, cheap trading might seem like a good thing. After all, “the ultimate winners in our decision to eliminate commissions were investors—a perfect example of our ‘Through Clients’ Eyes’ strategy in action,” trumpeted former Charles Shwab CEO Walt Bettinger in a 2019 annual report.
But it can actually be bad, particularly for the least sophisticated investors, according to research by Chicago Booth PhD student Ching-Tse Chen and National Taiwan University’s Ming-Jen Lin. They highlight a case where retail day traders saw costs cut by 15 basis points—but performance fell by more than five times as much, wiping out the savings and then some.
Multiple earlier projects have found that the typical retail investor loses money when trading actively, and some research points the finger at transaction costs that eat away at any potential returns.
However, Chen and Lin argue that the reality is more complicated. They focused on Taiwan’s stock market, a vibrant petri dish for exploring the trading behavior and outcomes of individual investors. Retail investors in that market generate 60 percent of average daily trading volume and represent more than 90 percent of day traders. Day-trading—which the researchers define as buying and selling in the same day, or vice versa—accounts for about 15 percent of daily volume.
In April 2017, those day traders saw their trading costs plummet when Taiwan halved its transaction tax on day-trades, cutting the tax from 0.3 percent to 0.15 percent. To understand the effects, Chen and Lin obtained transaction-level data for more than 120,000 retail accounts at a major Taiwanese brokerage, spanning November 2016 to October 2017. They focused on the 14,000 accounts that they deemed had at least one day of day-trading in the prior year.
If investors had kept trading as before, a tax cut should’ve made them better off. But many changed their behavior, and the researchers offer two explanations for how that hurt them.
Although a tax cut could have raised portfolio returns for Taiwanese day traders, those with small and medium portfolios saw lower overall returns because they traded more and performed worse on each trade in response to the reform.
First, bad traders started trading more. After the tax cut, the day-trading volume in the 14,000 day-trading accounts increased by 30 percent, the researchers document. They conclude that this was a direct result of the reform, noting that the volume of other trading in these accounts (which didn’t qualify as day-trading) didn’t change nearly as much.
The researchers partitioned day traders by account size, which is a common proxy for sophistication. Investors with the smallest accounts demonstrated the worst skill, typically losing money with each trade. But when costs fell, these investors increased their trading by 45 percent, versus 22 percent for the largest investors.
“This reform made the average investor worse off because there were a lot of losses from the less-sophisticated investors,” says Chen. “Somehow these less-sophisticated investors are the ones who think of lower costs as being more valuable, and they increase trading a lot. That is the reason they lose more money.” This, he says, is the primary reason that lower costs backfired on investor returns.
But the researchers also find a secondary explanation, which is that investors traded not just more but differently. For example, traders started relying more often on cognitive shortcuts such as placing more orders at round-number prices—say, $10.50 rather than $10.48. The Taiwanese market does not permit instant, at-the-market trades. Instead, all trades must be limit orders that specify either the highest price an investor will pay to buy shares or the lowest price they’ll accept to sell them. The share of round-number orders rose by 2 percentage points, or 7 percent from the pre-reform mean. Chen and Lin posit that the increased use of rounding reflects a focus on quick and easy trades rather than more targeted strategies.
Moreover, the researchers also find that in the wake of the tax cut, day traders paid less attention to their orders. They were 4 percent more likely to ignore an open limit order, which made them more vulnerable to missing market moves. The probability of modifying or canceling orders dropped by nearly 1 percentage point. Day traders also focused more on newsy, buzzy stocks. After the reform, investors’ trades become more concentrated in stocks that saw a lot of volume overnight.
This change in trading behavior dragged down day traders’ performance on a per-dollar basis. Before the tax cut, these investors had, on average, grossed 0.28 percent per dollar traded. That entire amount was paid out in trading costs, leaving a negative net return. The tax cut mechanically returned 0.15 percent per dollar traded, and yet investors didn’t keep all of that. Their average net returns rose only 0.1 percent per dollar traded.
Some investors saw their performance climb into break-even or positive territory, but not the least sophisticated investors, who still had negative net returns. And those negative returns were compounded by the additional trading.
In the end, while the cost savings should have raised the average portfolio return by more than 1 percent, returns instead fell by 0.8 percent—and less sophisticated investors did far worse. They had been losing about 6 percent of their portfolio each year, the researchers estimate. But after the tax cut, those losses fell further, to about 9 percent.
But the tax cut did work as intended, as it encouraged more day trading and improved the overall functioning of the market by enhancing liquidity. The fact that this better market quality came at the expense of day traders highlights a challenge for policymakers, the researchers write. Regulation of practices such as payment for order flow—where brokers offer zero-commission trades to retail investors and profit from routing those trades to third-party platforms—is already a hot issue. This research raises the prospect that removing or reducing the friction of trading costs may come at a high cost for individual investors, since lower trading costs appear to encourage more trading, and that generates worse returns for individual investors.
Ching-Tse Chen and Ming-Jen Lin, “The Economic Consequences of Lower Retail Trading Costs,” Working paper, November 2025.
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