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Chicago Booth Review Podcast Economics Has Changed. Are You Up-to-Date?
- November 11, 2026
- CBR Podcast
If you took economics in college, and if college was a few years ago, there’s a good chance your thinking could use an update. So what’s changed in economic thinking, and why does it matter? We hear from the University of Chicago’s Greg Kaplan in the first of two episodes about Macro, his new book on economic models. Among the insights in the book: It’s not only the poorest Americans who are living paycheck to paycheck.
Hal Weitzman: If you learned economics in college, and if college was a few years ago now, there's a good chance that your thinking could use an update. So what's changed in the study of economics and why does it matter?
Welcome to the Chicago Booth Review Podcast, where we bring you groundbreak academic research in a clear and straightforward way. I'm Hal Weitzman and today I'm talking with the University of Chicago's Greg Kaplan in the first of two episodes about Macro, his new book on economic models. Among the insights in the book, it's not only the poorest Americans who are living paycheck to paycheck.
Greg Kaplan, welcome to the Chicago Booth Review Podcast.
Greg Kaplan: Thanks for having me, Hal.
Hal Weitzman: We're delighted to have you. And we're here to talk about your book, Macro: The Economic Models that Shape Our World. If that doesn't sound like your sort of thing, I want to reassure the readers, this even has equations in it, Greg. Very bold. A lot of them as well. And you actually explain them, you don't just shove them in there. It's amazing. But definitely it's a great remedial education for someone like me who hasn't studied economics for a long time and also is going to surprise people who haven't studied economics like me for a long time because a lot has changed. Why'd you write the book?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, look, don't frighten anyone away with the equations.
Hal Weitzman: No, it's wonderful. And I will say, you're a great writer. It's really beautifully written and very entertaining and very engaging. Flies by.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, I appreciate that. Thanks Hal. Look, I mean, I wrote the book because there is just a massive gap between the way that economists working at the frontier of economic research think about macroeconomic policy, particularly big questions like how do we manage inflation? How do we respond to recessions? And the way that we read about them in newspapers and that many policymakers, pundits, and I guess most of the general public as well think about those issues.
Hal Weitzman: So take me into the mind of Greg Kaplan. Were you just reading the Wall Street Journal and the FT and getting frustrated? What was it that actually prompted you? Or do you just feel like you have a responsibility to get these ideas out there?
Greg Kaplan: So it's a bit of all of that. And I think that a lot of my colleagues would feel the same way, that we read the newspaper a lot and there's a lot of looking, thinking, "Hey, that's not the way that we think about these issues." And some of that's really outdated.
And my view is that we can't going to change that unless we make an effort to try and communicate that difference. And one of the reasons for that big gap I think is because there have been relatively few attempts to try and translate the modern approach to thinking through macroeconomic questions for a general audience. And I hope that some of those equations don't frighten people away because the goal is really to get this in front of people who are not economists. But who are interested in macroeconomic policy issues, which impact everyone and we read about all the time.
Hal Weitzman: Essentially this book is a ... I know you resist the word history, but it is. It's a history of macroeconomic models and how our thinking has changed from Keynes to the present day, right?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. And look, it is right that I try bring readers right up to what I think is the frontier of the way we think about these issues. But the reality is that framework that I think many people implicitly have in their mind is actually old, very old, has its roots in the 1940s and 1950s. And so in order to understand what has changed, it is necessary to go back quite far. So yeah, I have to cover a relatively large span of history. But I'm not a historian and the goal was not to give a comprehensive history of macroeconomic thought, but rather to give the necessary background so that people can understand where we are today.
Hal Weitzman: It's sort of a logical history, right? You build it up sort of from first principles to ... And then suddenly you're reading about very complex material and understanding it. Which is an amazing feeling for a reader. The book is about models. Why is that the way to talk about the economy, talk about models?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. So I think that's a great question and something to understand.
So macroeconomic policies by definition affect everyone. And one problem with the macroeconomy is that we only have one world. We have lots of different countries, but even in a more globalized society, it's more and more becoming the case that we really have one world. And so it becomes very hard to have a bedrock that we can run experiments in to think about the effects and learn about the effects of macroeconomic policies on the economy.
So what do economists do? We build artificial worlds. And those artificial worlds are what I refer to as models. And what they are is logically coherent, fully articulated artificial worlds. In the book, I describe them almost like a computer game. So it's not the real world, but you can imagine that there's people in this world, some of them are households, some of them are firms and they're making decisions. And so what economists do is they build these worlds. They include firms that produce stuff, workers that decide how much to spend and save. And we look at what happens in those artificial worlds when we conduct policies.
Hal Weitzman: And like you say, when we get it wrong, it has policy and it affects real people's lives and livelihoods, right? And one of the points you make several times in the book is that people learn stuff in college like I did. And that stuff is outdated now, or we know more, our thinking has evolved. What are the biggest ... And you talked about this gap. What are the biggest misconceptions?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. So look, I think that there is a particular economic framework that people have in mind. They don't realize it. You mentioned Keynes. It has its roots in Keynes. It has a name. It's called the ISLM model. It's a very simple set of equations, but the basic idea is that there's a large and strong role for governments to play in managing the economy by either moving interest rates around or more directly moving taxes and making payments to households. In other words, the government has a direct and very strong fuel line into the aggregate economy that they can use to manage the economy. So I think that's one of the kind of tenants-
Hal Weitzman: And that's a misconception?
Greg Kaplan: I think it's an overstatement of-
Hal Weitzman: Overstatement.
Greg Kaplan: ... the way we think about things. I would say the other tenant of that is a trade-off between inflation and unemployment. So if you go and read in the newspaper about discussions about interest rates or about stimulus policy, most of it's cashed in the terms of, well, we could try and lower unemployment at the cost of potentially some higher inflation or vice versa. That's known as the Phillips curve.
So these are kind of quite simple views of the world. They're not wrong, but they're vastly incomplete. And I think that what has changed is our understanding that that really simple view of how to conduct policy has led and continues to lead to misguided attempts to use these tools.
Hal Weitzman: Is that because the ideology is layered on top? So then it becomes about if and how the government should intervene?
Greg Kaplan: Look, I think simple direct channels through which you can influence the economy are extremely appealing. So having a very simple analogy like the economy's like a car and if we just prime the fuel line, it will move faster. And so then the only thing we have to think about is are we going to generate too much emissions in the form of inflation? That's a really appealing approach to policy, pushing towards a more nuanced approach where distribution matters, where there's limits on that, where maybe those fuel lines are not as direct. That leads to a more difficult policy problem, which is I think partly why it's stuck for so long.
Hal Weitzman: Okay. So let's get into some of the economics, some of the substance. And one of the old assumptions that have been challenged is that people used to make spending decisions based on their lifetime earnings. I mean, that sounds like something that isn't quite right. So maybe just quickly tell us how that came about and then how it has fallen out of favor or has evolved.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. So maybe we take a step back. So the simplest and most ubiquitous model of the way or theory of the way that people spend and save is known as the Keynesian consumption function. This is even simpler than the one that you described. It basically says that people look at their current income and they spend some fraction of it.
So if I give you a bit of money today, there's some fraction of it that you'll spend and some fraction of that you'll save. In fact, in that view of how people spend and save, which is a relatively old view, nothing about the future matters at all. Interest rates don't matter, whether you're going to retire in a few years time doesn't matter. What you expect about the state of the world doesn't matter. What you look at as your current income.
Now that theory of spending turned out to be at odds with a number of features of the data. And a lot of this history that I account is an interplay between theory and data. So someone proposes a theory, we look at the data, that adapts and we move on.
Hal Weitzman: And then as you cheekily say in the book that the economists call it a problem or a paradox because the data don't quite fit their models, right? And then they try and solve that problem.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. It's the process of science. We look for puzzles and then we try and improve our theories as a result.
But I think the theory that you were alluding to is the one that grew out of that, which is broadly known as the permanent income hypothesis. It was kind of the next big theory in consumption and savings. And what that theory posits is that people look at their lifetime earnings and make the decisions about how much to spend and save in order to do the best they can given what their lifetime resources would look like.
Now for somebody with a large amount of easily accessible liquid wealth or can easily borrow or access funds, it makes sense to consider your entire lifetime earnings. The problem is not really about how much to spend, that's based on your lifetime earnings. But the timing of which you're going to spend it. So in that theory, if I were to give you a little bit of money today, it's not going to change too much your spending because your spending's based on your lifetime earnings and that small amount of money doesn't have a big effect over your lifetime earnings.
Now that theory of consumption, if you confront that with the data, there's a lot of households in the US and other developed countries who seem to not spend in that way. They seem to be quite sensitive to small changes in their income. Economists call this the margin propensity to consume, so jargon that comes back from Keynes' general theory. But it basically quantifies the answer to the question I posed earlier. If I give you a little bit of money, how much of it would you spend?
And it turns out that there's a group of households in the US and other developed countries who actually, if you give them a bit of money, they're going to spend quite a large chunk of it. And so the more recent theories of spending and saving have tried to modify that theory that you alluded to encompass that type of behavior and allow for the fact that there are going to be some households that have very high propensities to consume, others that look like they're going to be more sensitive to their lifetime incomes and changes in interest rates. And that class of theories is known as the precautionary savings model and is at the heart of a lot of the modern macroeconomic models.
Hal Weitzman: Basically means that people save buffers of cash just in case something happens because there's uncertainty.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, that's the precautionary part. And of course some households aren't able to do that or have found themselves in situations where they can't. And those households are going to look much more like a household who's sensitive to their current resources in terms of their spending.
Hal Weitzman: Okay. The other shift in the models was that we at one point thought about a single representative household as representing the entire economy, a microcosm. And now that's shifted and we think about the millions of households that actually make up the economy. Now that we have changed the way that we approach that, how does that help us to think about the economy in a more subtle way or in a different way?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. And in a way that's the whole narrative of the book. And where this book ends up is a class of models that you are alluding to called Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian models.
Hal Weitzman: Yeah. HANK models.
Greg Kaplan: HANK models, it's an acronym. And that first part, heterogeneous agent is capturing what you're describing that these models try and encompass a large variety of different household financial positions in the model.
The households in the model might be wealthy, they might be poor, they might have high income or low income. And they could be heterogeneous in a large number of different ways. That evolution of introducing heterogeneity into the most modern class of models, that's the second part of the acronym. New Keynesian, the new part is an evolution of the way we think about the macroeconomy from those earlier Keynesian ISLM models. And I won't go into it now, but the book talks about what that achieved.
Once you introduce that heterogeneity, it does lead to different ways of thinking about monetary and fiscal policy. I can mention a few. One is that it naturally leads you to start thinking about things like redistribution and the distributional consequences of macroeconomic policies. You start to realize that the distribution of consequences of so-called aggregate policies might not be small second order things that we can ignore. But rather might be the whole game or big part of the game. In fact, what we realize is a lot of what we think about as aggregate policies actually work by redistributing, by shifting resources between different types of households.
So I'll give one example, a fiscal stimulus, which is the idea of raising funds either from debt or future taxes to pay to households in recessions is typically thought of as an aggregate policy. We're going to give money to households, they'll go out and spend that money that will lead firms to hire more workers, which will put more money in their pockets and we'll get a virtuous cycle that's known as a Keynesian multiplier and will boost the economy.
But in fact, what we realize when we look at the fiscal stimulus more carefully through the lens of a world with heterogeneity is it's primarily a redistributive tool because that money that gets paid to households has to come from somewhere. And there's really only two possibilities. Either it can come from raising taxes or cutting transfers from some other people either now or in the future. And either way, that's redistribution. It's taking money either from our future selves to ourselves or other people today to ourselves ... to a group of people. And so the effect of the policy is really going to depend on those offsetting effects, whether it's the future versus the past or one group versus another group.
And if you don't raise future taxes or lower transfers to pay for this stimulus, then ultimately it's going to get paid some way or another. So that's going to happen through inflation. Might be in the future, but there's going to have to be some inflation to pay for that. And that itself is going to impact different households in different ways and you're going to be effectively retaking from certain households and giving to others. So through that lens, you kind of have a completely different view of fiscal stimulus as a tool to stabilize the economy. It becomes a distributional issue to think about.
Hal Weitzman: Greg Kaplan, in the first half, we talked about your book, Macro, and you gave us some understanding why models, how models have evolved. One of the things that helps us understand the evolution models is your own research and this idea that I want you to explain to us about the wealthy hand to mouth, this idea that people who are living paycheck to paycheck aren't necessarily who we think they are. Tell us more about that.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. So the wealthy hand to mouth. So what is a hand-to-mouth household? A hand-to-mouth household is a household who essentially uses all of their disposable income every pay period on buying stuff. They're effectively not actively saving because they are living paycheck to paycheck.
And hand-to-mouth households that live paycheck to paycheck are particularly important for macroeconomics and the impacts of macroeconomic policy. Because they are sensitive to small changes in their resources. You give money to someone who's living paycheck to paycheck, there's a good chance that they're going to want to need to spend that money relatively rapidly. And that pushes that money back into the economy and primes the multiplier that we talked about.
Now, the issue is, if you look in the data, look at households who have very little wealth, it turns out there's not that many of them in the United States. On the side around say 10% of households have no wealth left at the end of every pay period. But there's another group of households who effectively also live paycheck to paycheck, but do have substantial amount of wealth. Those are what we call the wealthy hand-to-mouth households. And the difference is that the wealth they have is tied up in relatively illiquid forms of assets.
So that's primarily equity in their house, tax deferred retirement accounts like 401(k) plans, a lot of private businesses. But they have relatively little in easily accessible liquid wealth in their cash or checking accounts. And so even though these households are not poor in the sense of not having any wealth, they still might be living close to or approximately paycheck to paycheck. We call them wealthy hand-to-mouth households, they're not necessarily wealthy in the conventional sense of the world. These are typically middle class households. But they're wealthy in the sense that they have some wealth. And in the US, there's roughly a third of households fall into this category.
Hal Weitzman: And I imagine that's something that will resonate with a lot of people, that they feel like they are not really generating enough to ... Or they're barely generating enough to get by. But actually, as you say, objectively, people will have a retirement fund. They'll have a nice car and a house where they have some equity. So now we understand that, that not everyone ... That there are more people. So in what proportion of people are the wealthy hand to mouth?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, it's roughly about a third of US households fall in this category.
Hal Weitzman: So if we take all the hand-to-mouth households ...
Greg Kaplan: Of all hand-to-mouth households, the vast majority are wealthy hand-to-mouth households.
Hal Weitzman: But I'm saying if we take that as a-
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, 40%. Somewhere between 30 and 40%, depending on how you measure it.
Hal Weitzman: So it's very significant. So tell us about how that affects ... A lot of what we're talking about, the broader context is when there's a recession or a financial crisis, often the government will respond or the central bank will respond with some kind of easing. They want to do something with interest rates or they want to do something by sending people stimulus checks. Now we understand that more people than we may have thought were living hand to mouth. How does that paycheck to paycheck, how does that affect those kinds of policies?
Greg Kaplan: There's a few different ways and they're important. The first one is that a household who's wealthy hand to mouth, living paycheck to paycheck is also going to be typically quite ... Their spending will be quite sensitive to small changes in their income. So these are households like the households who really have no wealth at all. If you were to give them temporary inflows of income, say fiscal stimulus payments, there is also a good chance that they will spend those relatively rapidly.
So if you're looking at an economy where you have 40% rather than 10% of households who have a high propensity to spend, that gives you a very different view of what the potential impacts would be of fiscal stimulus payments or transfers to households. You might get a much higher boost in spending than you would otherwise. So that group is important for that reason.
They're also important because a lot of them are not actively saving. Most of those savings that we talked about, their wealth is held in illiquid forms that is kind of on autopilot, the housing, their retirement accounts. But on a day-to-day basis, they are effectively using whatever cash is available. That means that makes them relatively less sensitive to movements in interest rates. Because interest rates affect the return on saving, and if you're not actively saving, well then you're going to be less sensitive to movements and interest rates.
Hal Weitzman: And in America, most people have locked in their mortgage rate, the rate which they borrow for a long period.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, that's a great point because one of the strongest channels through which interest rates affect the economy in countries where people have adjustable rate mortgages, meaning that the mortgage payments move in line with the official interest rates, is through changing mortgage payments.
In the US, for the most part, that channel is mute. It's not exactly mute because there are times when interest rates fall, people might refinance their mortgage. Although that depends a lot on how many people have done that in the past, if people have previously refinanced their mortgage recently, further reductions in interest rates are not going to have as big effect on refinancing rates.
But as a whole, it does mean that once you take that into account that the presence of a large fraction of households who are hand to mouth, poor or wealthy, might mute the effect or at least the direct channel that a central bank has from changing interest rates into its effect on household spending.
Hal Weitzman: So would I be right in thinking that on the one hand, interest rates might not be as powerful a device as we though. But stimulus checks might be more powerful than we thought if we get them to the right people?
Greg Kaplan: Well, it depends on what we thought, and so that's why-
Hal Weitzman: Of course.
Greg Kaplan: That's why I think it's really interesting. Let me maybe just get a little nerdy for one second here. I mean, it really depends on what your starting point was.
In our earlier conversation, we talked about two different ways that we thought about the way people spend. What I said, how I think a lot of the general public, when we read the newspaper, thinks about it, this old Keynesian model. Which effectively assumes that people have very, very high propensities to consume. That theory assumes that almost all households are very, very strong propensities to spend. So if you start from there and you go back down to 60% of households actually are kind of pretty high [inaudible 00:22:54]-
Hal Weitzman: But am I right in thinking-
Greg Kaplan: ... they would have a smaller response.
Hal Weitzman: Am I right in thinking that the trajectory is basically from Keynes, that we thought there was a high marginal propensity, then the thinking evolved to a very low, and now with your research, we're somewhere in the middle.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, but look, I don't want to think of this as being a failure of previous research.
Hal Weitzman: Sure.
Greg Kaplan: I think a big chunk of this was that because we realized that how people spending responds to these one-time payments is so important for policy, we developed more tools to go out and measure this in the data and better data sets became available. So the way I would describe it is that there were sort of two theories on the table, one that predicted a relatively high propensity to consume somewhere 80 to 90%, one that predicted very low one, like 0 to 5%. When we look in the data, what we see is actually it's somewhere in the middle. It's more like on average 20 to 25%. And that 20 to 25% is split between a group of households, the hand-to-mouth, who have relatively high propensities to spend. And then another group of households, the non-hand-to-mouth household, households with liquid buffers that have relatively low propensities to spend. So it's really not one or the other, but rather what the economy looks like is a mixture of the two.
Hal Weitzman: It's both. Everyone was right, it turns out. So just one final question I wanted to ask you before we ... And next time we have you back, we want to talk about the policy implications of all this. But there is this more nuanced understanding that we have, thanks to your research of you and many others, sheds light on inequality. So that we can think differently about inequality in a way that we couldn't as well before with our previous models. Just tell us briefly about that.
Greg Kaplan: Look, I think a big part of what the HANK models do is they allow us to integrate the study of distributions into the study of macroeconomic stabilization. So for a long time in the history of economic practice and thought these were ... At least in the development of models, these were sort of two separate fields of inquiry, one about aggregate stabilization and one about distribution.
I think one of the lessons here is that these two things are inextricably linked. We talked earlier about the way that fiscal stimulus affects the economy by distributing. It also goes in the other direction that when a central bank changes interest rates, it necessarily has distributional consequences. It's good for some people, bad for others. So when we think about the impacts of stabilization policy, it shouldn't be an afterthought to think about the distributional consequences of those as well. Those go hand in hand.
Hal Weitzman: Okay. Well, Greg Kaplan, this has been a great conversation. We've had an introduction. We'll get more into it in the next episode, but thank you for coming on the Chicago Booth Review Podcast.
Greg Kaplan: Thanks for having me, Hal.
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