Chicago Booth Review Podcast How Much Power Does the Fed Really Have?
- November 18, 2026
- CBR Podcast
When recessions hit, policymakers often respond with stimulus checks and interest rate changes. But do those measures achieve their intended goals? We hear from the University of Chicago’s Greg Kaplan in the second of two episodes about Macro, his new book on economic models. Who really benefits from stimulus and interest rate moves? And how much power does the Fed really have?
Hal Weitzman: When recessions hit, policymakers often respond with stimulus checks and interest rate changes. But do those measures achieve their intended goals? Welcome to the Chicago Booth Review Podcast, where we bring you groundbreaking academic research in a clear and straightforward way. I'm Hal Weitzman. Today, I'm talking with University of Chicago's Greg Kaplan in the second of two episodes about Macro, his new book on economic models. Who really benefits from stimulus and interest rate moves, and how much power does the Fed really have? Greg Kaplan, welcome back to the Chicago Booth Review Podcast.
Greg Kaplan: Thanks for having me.
Hal Weitzman: Well, we're delighted to have you back to talk more about your book, Macro: The Economic Models That Shape Our World. A lot of the context here is the Great Recession and the Great Financial Crisis, 2007 and 08. And at the time, you talk about you were working in the Federal Reserve, 2007. And around that time, you say there was sort of a split between the economists and the people working in central banks who they were thinking in a way that the economic thinking had been updated. It was what you call New Keynesians, right? And the people who are actually making the policy, the people that they were reporting to were thinking like Old Keynesians. Just tell us briefly, what is the split between Old Keynesians and New Keynesians, and why did that exist?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, look, you're talking about a time when I had just finished my PhD, so my graduate training in economics. And there's a class of models that I learned about during my PhD, which are known as New Keynesian models. New Keynesian models are modern macroeconomic models that try and build an artificial world, a version of the real world that we can think about in which firms and households make decisions that we can use to study the impacts of policies in the real world. And the most modern, up-to-date incarnation of those around 2008 was the so-called representative agent New Keynesian models or the rank models that you refer to. Now, this was a time that was quite puzzling for me because there was a recession going on, just coming straight out of the financial crisis. And much of the discussion about the proposed policies that were being talked about at the time, I found quite hard to make sense of through the lens of what I'd learned in graduate school through these models.
So in particular, a lot of that discussion was something called fiscal stimulus payments, which was the idea that, well, the central bank has lowered rates as far as it could go. There was nothing more it could do. We'd hit the zero lower bound. And so the discussion came towards big stimulus, issuing debt, printing money and sending it out to households. Now, the problem is through the lens of those models that I studied in grad school, representative-agent New Keynesian models, if you were to transfer money to households funded by cutting taxes in the future, it should have no effect on the economy whatsoever. Now, that's not a statement that whether that would happen or would not happen in reality, but it certainly was the predictions of what the state of the art was. And yet if you read the newspapers or looked at the rhetoric of policymakers, it was clear that's not the model that they had in mind because that's not what they were thinking would be the effect of these policies.
The model that they had in mind was a much older model known as an Old Keynesian model, which is probably more familiar to people who studied economics in undergrad or even in high school. According to that model, if you were to issue debt and send money to households, there could potentially be a very big impact on the economy. So there was this tension.
Hal Weitzman: A multiplier effect, right?
Greg Kaplan: A multiplier effect.
Hal Weitzman: And like you say in the book, you love to give the example of... I know you play guitar, right? So you'd love to give the example of your guitar lesson. So you pay your guitar teacher and then the guitar teacher takes some proportion of your payment and pays their yoga teacher. And there's a cycle there where your whatever it is, hundred dollar lesson produces a large boost to the economy that's much bigger than the hundred dollars.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, that's the classic Old Keynesian multiplier...
Hal Weitzman: That we all know...
Greg Kaplan: ... that we all love and learn. But that multiplier is not there in those modern models. Now, there are lots of reasons for that. We can maybe get into them. One of them is that that Old Keynesian story that we just talked about never says anything about where that initial money came from. And there's various other issues as well, particularly about the implicit assumptions about how people decide to spend that money, what they do with it, which is a lot of what the book is about. But this is all stuff I only realized much later. At the time, it was confusing for me. I mean, I'm not saying it's confusing for the profession, it was confusing for me because on the one hand, there's this sharp discrepancy between what seems to be the conventional wisdom and what seems to be the state of the art in terms of thinking about the impacts of those policies.
Hal Weitzman: I mean, that's one of the motivations for writing the book is that in some sense, maybe it's because the people who are politicians tend to be of an older generation, but the people who are actually making the policy in many cases haven't really updated their thinking with some of the more subtle innovations that you've talked about. We talked in the last episode about computer game. It's almost like when I was a kid, I'm older than you, but when I was a kid, the early games, binatone games, it was just like tennis or whatever. It's a little pixel bouncing between two characters, which bears no relation to the much more complex games that you get today. So it's almost as if I have in mind the computer game is the binatone game with the paddle where just the two simple players playing tennis when actually, what we now know is much more complex. But there's a gap, isn't there, that still exists?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. And look, that difference between the old games and the new games, the new games don't just develop because we develop new technology, they develop because we look at the old games, we look at their predictions, we look at the real world, we get newer and better data, and we realize that we need to update those models to reflect those changes in behavior. And those changes that are relevant is really about how households spend and save. But you're right that certainly in 2008, for the purposes of thinking about these sorts of policies, it really was an old class of models that I think was justifying those policies.
Hal Weitzman: And then in the pandemic, the same kind of thinking?
Greg Kaplan: Similar sort of thinking. The thing is, it's not to say that economists had not updated their models. This idea of introducing more realistic spending and savings behavior into macroeconomics was a process that had been going on since the '90s. It just took a long time for us to understand and connect with what it means for stabilization policy, and how it affects our understanding of the way that a central bank and a treasury should react during a recession.
Hal Weitzman: Okay, so as you say, a lot of it is about recessions and how governments respond to them. You make a distinction between what a recession does to the overall economy, and what it does to individual households. Why is that distinction so important?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, that's a really important distinction. And I think the issue is that recessions are not equally felt by everyone. So I give an example in the book. I think the numbers were if we take that 2008 recession, aggregate output, the amount of stuff that we produce in the economy, dropped by about 5% over a period of two years. Now, spread equally across society, that's a 5% drop in income on the back of roughly a decade of pretty strong growth. It's not a big deal. But the issue is that-
Hal Weitzman: Well it's not nice, but it's not maybe catastrophic.
Greg Kaplan: It's not nice, but it's not catastrophic, right? And particularly if you've got a lot of wealth, on average is the economy, if we add up all the wealth held by households, plenty of welfare to smooth that out. So if you look at the world through the lens of what I've called a representative agent, so I mean we're all going to share in that together, it's pretty easy to buffer that out, and the welfare consequences of it are pretty minor. That's not how things play out. How they actually play out is much closer to 5% of people taking a 100% drop in earnings than 100% of people taking a 5% drop in earnings. And for that group of people, it is catastrophic. And so to think about the impacts of a recession, how we respond to it, it's essential to think about those heterogeneous impacts rather than just the effect on the aggregate economy.
Hal Weitzman: Right, and so I mean some people are really very, very badly affected as we know, and other people are perfect. In fact, some people benefit during recessions, right?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah.
Hal Weitzman: So when we come thinking about policy, those distinctions are obviously critical. One thing that occurs to me is recessions. Are recessions just inevitable, or should governments try to stop recessions from happening, or should they just try to help those people that you talk about, the 5% who are the worst affected when they do actually happen?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah. Look, it's a tough question because all recessions are different, right? Was the COVID recession inevitable? Well, that depends where you go, but to some extent, there was going to be a recession if there's going to be a pandemic. I like to think of that a little bit like if you're an athlete, over the course of your career, it's inevitable that you're going to get injured at some point. Is any one injury preventable or inevitable? No, there's plenty of things that you could do. You can always look ex-post, you can always take precautions. I see it's the same for governments. There are going to be recessions. That doesn't mean that there's not things that we can do to try and foresee them. That's important, but it's also important to have a system in place to adequately deal with them when they hit. So my answer is it's a little bit of both, and I think it's a role for governments to both respond to recessions, but also to have the right institutions in place to minimize the likelihood of occurrence.
Hal Weitzman: When there's a recession, then one of the things governments naturally reach for is stimulus.
Greg Kaplan: Yeah.
Hal Weitzman: People have been affected, like you say, small group of people have been very badly affected. We want to help them. We want to send them a check. And the idea being, if they're hurting, they're more likely to spend that check, so there'll be a big boost to the economy. Is that a good policy?
Greg Kaplan: It's a tough one because one of the more controversial conclusions that I reach in the book is that the idea that we can, "Stimulate the economy," by sending checks to households and lowering interest rates is perhaps overstated, maybe relative to I think what we'd like to believe. But that doesn't mean that there's not a potential value in those policies. I think that the most important, the most valuable component of them is that they alleviate the hardship of households that are most affected. Of course, that's a much harder political sell because that's a redistributive motive. We're basically giving money to people to help them directly. It's going to cost someone else as compared with the political sell of, "Well, no, what we're really doing is boosting the aggregate economy. We're helping everyone." I think one of the things we've learned is that that force, that, "Multiplier force," is potentially much weaker than I think a lot of us would like to believe.
Hal Weitzman: So it helps out the individuals because they get more cash, but it doesn't really have a big effect on the economy?
Greg Kaplan: I think that's right. I mean, in the book, I give a kind of cheap anecdote and say, listen, the $18 billion that we spent on trying to get vaccines during COVID did drastically more to support the economy than the $5 trillion that we sent to households. Now, that's maybe a relatively cheap one, but I think you could tell similar stories say in the 2008 recession, that the efforts done to stabilize financial markets, provide liquidity and stem contagion probably did a lot more to minimize the duration and depth of the recession than the money that we directly sent out to households in the form of checks.
What that says is that I think a better approach to thinking about how to respond to recessions is to intervene at the source because every recession is different. Try and understand whatever it is that the fundamental driver of the recession is going to be intervening there is going to be a much more effective way of mitigating the recession than trying to just send money to households and let the multiplier run its course. That doesn't mean we shouldn't try help households. But again, a better way to do that would be a broader system of social insurance that operates regardless of the need for one-time stimulus during recessions.
Hal Weitzman: Greg Kaplan, in the first half, we talked more about your book Macro: The Economic Models That Shape Our World and the policy challenges that come from that, like stimulus. The other one that you talk about is central banks and the way that they try to control interest rates or the real rates that affect the economy. Tell us about that because we often look to the Fed in the US and think that the Fed is sort of responsible for inflation, for example, right now. Is that right, and is there a lot they can do about it, or do we overestimate their power?
Greg Kaplan: Again, I think it's not a binary answer. Central banks are crucially important. I think it's absolutely right that they have a mandate focused on inflation. But we do tend to maybe give them more credit and more responsibilities than is warranted in the sense that a central bank can't manage inflation on its own. It's important that our fiscal position is in order. When we issue a large amount of debt, print money effectively to transfer to households, that's a fiscal policy, that's going to result in inflation. And there's very little that a central bank can do to stem that. More broadly, if we persistently run deficits without any plan to repay debt, looking to a central bank to manage or to prevent the inevitable inflation is a little bit too much to ask.
Hal Weitzman: I feel like you're describing exactly the situation we're in right now.
Greg Kaplan: You said that, not me.
Hal Weitzman: Well, we have been in a situation where, I mean, even if we put the war in Iran to one side, but the things like tariffs, the government has been doing things that many people feel would be inflationary, whereas it's been calling on the central bank to lower interest rates. And is that sort of an example of the uncoordinated action that you're talking about?
Greg Kaplan: Look, I think if there's one robust finding from modern macroeconomics, it's that the control of the price level and inflation is ultimately a joint fiscal and monetary responsibility. When fiscal policy is highly disciplined, when all future interest payments are met by raising high taxes, when a government is willing and able to raise the taxes it needs to fund its payments, then there's a strong role for the central bank in being able to manage the timing of inflation and being able to manage inflation. When a fiscal policy is not responsible, it becomes much harder for a central bank, if not impossible, to stem inflation. So I think that's the big takeaway. Inflation is a joint monetary and fiscal responsibility.
Hal Weitzman: Okay. So when the Fed raises rates and they're trying to combat inflation, that has a differential effect on different households.
Greg Kaplan: Absolutely.
Hal Weitzman: Like you said, it's [inaudible 00:16:19].
Greg Kaplan: Yeah.
Hal Weitzman: So who benefits and who loses?
Greg Kaplan: Well, we have to think through what those effects are. So I think the simplest one is that you're raising interest rates. Somebody who earns interest is going to benefit from that because they receive interest. So think for example, as a retiree that's invested their retirement wealth in a portfolio of government bonds, the returns go up because interest rates go up, they're going to get higher income. On the other hand, who would suffer from that? Well, we could think about a first time home buyer who's about to buy a house and lock in a 30-year mortgage. If interest rates go up, that's a significant loss in wealth to them. Now, that's just the direct effect because then there's going to be second round effects as well. We have to think through what the impact would be on inflation. Now, presumably, the reason why the central bank raised rates was to try and lower inflation.
We've talked about whether they're able to or not, but let's put that to the side, imagine they succeed in raising inflation, that's also going to have redistributive consequences. So a household who holds a lot of nominal assets is going to suffer because the value of those assets falls when prices rise, so for example, if you hold a lot of cash. On the other hand, if you have a big mortgage where you owe cash but have a real asset, a house, you benefit from inflation because you have to repay your mortgage with dollars that are worth less. So there's a lot of complicated redistribution that goes on depending on what the portfolios and assets are that households of different ages and different wealth levels hold.
Hal Weitzman: It's multifaceted, isn't it? And I sort of wonder, hearing you speak, if this idea of having independent central banks, which I know you support, but it's complicated, isn't it, because there isn't that coordination that you're talking about? They insist on their independence, which is fine and useful in one respect, but then there's a completely uncoordinated with the policies like helping those who are most affected by a particular event that might offset some of the effects of what they're trying to do.
Greg Kaplan: Absolutely. Look, the idea that aggregate policies like interest rate movements or policies of the central bank affect only the size of the pie and not the distribution, that is a fiction, but a really useful fiction if we want to think about the support and justify an independent central bank. It's much easier to get the political will if the size of the slices of the pie are not at stake in these central bank decisions. Unfortunately though, as you say, the reality is that they are, and central banks do, whether they like it or not, have redistributive consequences in what they do.
And that doesn't mean there's not a huge amount of value in independence of central banks because they play a big role to play as a lender of last resort, but also in the broader institutional context of trying to minimize the proclivity towards monetary finance, meaning making it more difficult institutionally for governments to finance their expenditures by printing money. That's ultimately why a independent central bank is so important. But I think we do need to be aware of the fact that what they do does have redistributive consequences, and my view is central bank should be on top of that and aware of it so that they're not caught by surprise.
Hal Weitzman: So Greg, I have to ask you about AI and the way that AI is changing economics. And you talked about the models and we talked about how they're becoming more complex. With AI, they could be extremely complex, right? We could go down to a very minute level and talk about the effect of policy. What are you seeing in terms of the use of AI to make models more complex, even more nuanced?
Greg Kaplan: Yeah, it is a great question because between the time when I started writing this book or started thinking about it and the time now today, we have a whole new technology that's suddenly available for thinking about to build models. And in some ways, what the story of the book is, it's the story of the evolution of models, and it's inevitable that AI is going to change what those models look like. I don't think it's going to change the need for models, because in some ways, remember the fundamental issue here is that we only have one world, and we can't perform experiments in that world in order to learn about counterfactual. So we're going to need artificial worlds in order to do those experiments. I think what AI will do will change what those artificial worlds look like.
Now, this question of does that mean, as you say, that you're going to become more and more realistic? Well, yes, in some ways, but again, realism is not necessarily the primary criteria of a good model. What it might do is allow us to better capture the way in which the actors inside our models behave. At the end of the day, we have to make assumptions about what the behavior is of the households, the firms, governments inside those models. And I'm already starting to see people using AI tools and repurposing large language models to take the economic models that I talk about in the book, but maybe improve upon or generate more realistic behavior of the agents inside those models. So I think that's a really exciting avenue. It's hard to predict where this is going to go, but...
Hal Weitzman: We'll have to be back.
Greg Kaplan: ... yeah, HANK models are not going to be the end.
Hal Weitzman: We'll have you back to talk about whatever they are.
Greg Kaplan: Absolutely.
Hal Weitzman: Whatever the next thing is. All right, Greg Kaplan, so fun to have you on the Chicago Booth Review podcast. Thanks for joining us.
Greg Kaplan: Thank you, it's been a joy.
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