Capitalisn’t: What a Nobel Laureate Fears More than AI
- November 10, 2026
- CBR - Capitalisnt
Technology has long been the one part of the economy that never hit a wall. No society has ever run out of ideas. Northwestern’s Joel Mokyr, the economic historian who won the 2025 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences for identifying what makes growth self-sustaining, believes all of that and is frightened anyway.
What worries Mokyr is not new technology like artificial intelligence, but the social and political institutions it sits inside of: the tolerance for heretical ideas that invention depends on, the contestability that keeps dominant firms honest, and the public bodies that decide which claims about the world are established and which are not.
Mokyr’s prescription is not caution. He thinks the money going into AI looks like a bubble, that a reckoning is likely, and that the right response is to move faster anyway, because demography and climate are not waiting for anyone.
Joel Mokyr: I'm looking at the investment numbers today for AI, and just these power centers, and it worries me a great deal. I think it is something of a speculative bubble, but again, that is not abnormal.
Luigi Zingales: Bethany, do you remember when the funny idea was secular stagnation? Around that time, I remember a conference; I think it was at Columbia, and the panelists were two prominent Northwestern professors. On the one hand, there was Robert Gordon, who expressed the view that low-hanging fruits had been picked and we're destined for stagnation; on the other hand, Joel Mokyr expressed the view that advancing science provides ladders to reach higher and higher up in the trees, and that high-hanging fruits may be of higher quality, and now we can be able to achieve that.
Bethany McLean: Well, at least right now, in some ways, it looks like Mokyr's optimism was right. At least his insights on technology have been so valuable that the Nobel Committee awarded him the 2026 Nobel Prize in Economics.
Luigi: Given that we spend most episodes of this show interrogating whether capitalism as currently practiced deserves the credit it gets, we wanted to bring the guy who'd won a Nobel for saying it basically does, with some very pointed caveats.
Bethany: Yes. In his first Nobel lecture, Mokyr did not seem so optimistic, and to be fair, he remains a techno-optimist, but he argues that innovation is never just about better machines; it depends on all sorts of other things: culture, politics, and maybe most importantly, the freedom to challenge accepted wisdom.
Luigi: The worry is that the right institutional environment is not present anymore. To find out whether a technological process can be sustained politically, let's welcome Joel Mokyr to the show. Joel, I remember in 2013, more or less, there was a conference in New York. You came out against Robert Gordon, very optimistic about technology, and I was very impressed by your optimism that now it turns out to be true. What in your research made you so confident?
Joel: Well, the last 250 years, technological progress has been, really, the one engine that has steered us into the kind of economy we are today. It's not the only thing that's been happening, but it's the one thing that doesn't run into diminishing returns. I know there are people like my colleague, Bob Gordon, who think that eventually, we're going to run out of ideas. The historical record really suggests that there is no evidence whatsoever that people will ever run out of ideas.
Bethany: The most famous words are, "This time is different." If AI, and I'm saying this as an if, is primarily a regurgitator of already existing human knowledge, does that change what the predictions for AI might look like?
Joel: A lot of innovation is not necessarily totally new ideas, but it is the recombination of existing ideas, but in order to recombine them, you have to know what's there. The more accessible knowledge is, the easier it is to do these things. I have argued in the past that, in fact, access itself is part of the engine of technological change. In the 18th century, one of the things that we see is that access machines drive progress.
There weren't obviously things like the internet, but there were encyclopedias, and there were compendia, and everything was made more accessible by alphabetization and tricks like that. Of course, AI itself is just essentially an access machine; in other words, it collects a huge amount of information and makes it more accessible, but it also makes it more analyzable.
You have a whole bunch of data, millions and millions of observations, and finding a pattern and making these data talk to you and answer questions that you pose, that's a key to progress. I am optimistic. I think we will become much more technologically sophisticated in the next 25, 30 years. Now, that may be the good news, or it may be the bad news, okay? I am no longer all that sure that that progress cannot be abused, not just by tyrannical governments or things like that, but also by cyber criminals, by fools, by all dubious characters.
There's a whole school of thought that really believes that much of the progress we have sustained in the 20th century has actually not increased human welfare; I disagree with that, and most economists, I think, would, but there's no question that it can be abused and misused. Of course, for the first time, we're living in a world in which we have the technological means to extinguish all life on the planet, and that, as the macroeconomist would say, would be an absorbing state.
Luigi: Speaking of depressing thoughts, my reading of your Nobel lecture was less optimistic than I thought. You're very techno-optimistic. However, you seem to suggest that for progress to flourish, you need some political conditions, and these political conditions might not be there. Can you elaborate on that thought?
Joel: I guess. I'm not just worried about democracy itself; I'm more worrying about people's commitment to enlightenment-based institutions, to freedom of the press, to freedom of speech. It doesn't just come from the right; it comes from the left. You can see that, of course, in American universities. When I was growing up in the '60s and '70s, we thought that this was the end of history, as Fukuyama would put it, that we finally reached the stage in which we were no longer going to fight stupid wars, and we're no longer going to suppress people we disagree with, and on and on and on.
I think maybe that kind of optimism was premature. What frightens me, as it should frighten anybody, is that if institutions are going to get worse but that technology is going to get better, then the gap between them increases. Stasi with AI. That's a frightening thought. No, I don't think we're reaching yet the stage in which Western democracies are going to end up having Stasi-kind of organizations, but we are certainly not moving in the right direction, and that's frightening.
Bethany: Is the bigger risk, then, AI or the environment, the political and social environment in which AI is entering or being brought forth? Is that true, historically speaking, from your work, that you can't separate the technology itself from the time in which it evolved and flourished?
Joel: Yes. When you say environment, I think you mean political environment.
Bethany: Well, political and social, and the social norms as well.
Joel: Yes. No, I think that's absolutely right. One interesting example of that: between 1650, or thereabouts- say, the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, something like that- we see a growing commitment of Europe to religious tolerance. It's slow-moving, and it had setbacks and so on, but it's fair to say that in the 19th century, the idea of fighting each other over deep issues such as the transubstantiation of Christ or something like that was no longer happening.
Other things came into their place, which weren't all that hot either, but at least within each country, we were willing to decide things without resorting to violence. That seems to be slowly fading, and that worries me a lot. Now, how that will affect technological change remains to be seen, but it strikes me that one of the things that people who are really creative and really innovative and think outside the box, really the sort of Newtons and Lavoisiers of this world, that they really will prefer to live in a society which is more tolerant and in which they can come up with crazy ideas.
Because remember, for every brilliant idea that's novel, there are 99 ideas that are novel that are just stupid and that are wrong, and that's fine. We don't know in advance which ones are which, so we have to tolerate all of them. If there is really a suppression of ideas that the government doesn't like, as we seem to be following these days, we're not there yet, and we're still far from it in the US, and thank God, we may never get there, but I don't like the direction in which this is going, and it is going in that direction in many countries.
We may very well look at a Europe in which two of the oldest and best-established democracies, France and Britain, may switch to governments that feel the same way, and that, again, is extremely worrisome.
Luigi: Speaking of the political and social environment, in your lecture, you mentioned the success that the Chinese had in their scientific and technological achievements during the Song and Yuan dynasties. At some point, the technological process in China stopped. Why and what lessons should we learn from it?
Joel: Well, [laughs] I'm not sure that we should learn too many lessons from one observation, but the Chinese story is fascinating. People have puzzled and agonized over the mysterious decline of China as a technological, and I should say scientific and cultural leader, which it was around the Song Dynasty, and there's a slow decline in that. It shows that if you leave innovation, not just technological innovation, but scientific innovation, philosophical innovation, any kind of research, if you leave that largely to the government and you do not farm it out to the private sector, then it only survives as long as the government wants to do it.
What happens in China is, after the Song Dynasty was overthrown, that government had less and less interest in encouraging innovation because they thought innovation was disruptive, that it was making waves, that it may threaten the political status quo, and they didn't like it. You really see over time not only that progress stopped, but in fact, many of the techniques that had been around were lost.
In the West, no government could ever terminate technological change completely because they had basically farmed it out to the private sector. It isn't really until the second half of the 19th century that China becomes aware of the fact that if they're not going to jump on this bandwagon, they will end up being conquered the way Africa and India were. In the end, of course, it led to all kind of political change in China: first, the overthrow of the emperor, and then a few decades later, the rise of Maoism.
The main thing that China teaches me, at least, is that if you want sustainable and sustained innovation, not just in technology, as I said, but in science, in mathematics, in whatever it is, it has to be farmed out to the private sector and be subject to a free and open market for ideas.
Bethany: If that free and open environment matters so very much, does corporate structure matter as much, too? What I mean by that is that today's frontier AI is being developed inside a handful of enormously powerful corporations whose models are increasingly closed and whose computational resources are difficult to replicate. Fast followers can get close, but they can never be on the frontier edge. Does that corporate structure matter to this idea of openness and flourishing of contested ideas that you're talking about?
Joel: I've never quite been able to decide to what extent the rise of the big business corporation and the threat of concentrating a great deal of wealth and political power in the hands of a few large firms, to what extent that's a source of strength or a source of weakness. There's this old Schumpeterian debate about that: maybe large corporations are what you need because there's economies of scale; they have better access to finance, dah, dah, dah, dah, dah.
What I think counts more than anything else is that we should make sure that whatever powerful large corporations are at the moment dominant, that there is always contestability in the system. If they don't keep up their continuous innovation and willingness to try new things, they will end up like Kodak or Xerox or be completely transformed, like IBM. As long as there's turnover and as long as there's entry of new corporations, I am not too worried about too much power concentrating in the hands of a few corporations.
Remember, the United States went through this. In the late 19th century, we had this mass hysteria by the Progressive Movement about these rubber barons, these railroad tycoons, and the steel tycoons, and the oil tycoons; I mean John D. Rockefeller, who famously gave all his spare change to the U of C and founded Luigi's institution, but most of these incredibly powerful people eventually faded and were replaced by others, and the others that were replaced were, in their turn, replaced.
10 years ago, who had heard of Nvidia? I don't think there's going to be any sort of mega corporation that will eventually end up ruling the world in some science-fiction matrix kind of world. I don't think that these things happen. It is somewhat fascinating, but also perhaps worrisome that we now actually may have a trillionaire. In a way, that trillion dollars that Musk is supposed to have is a bit fake. It's conditional and all kind of things that look utterly unrealistic. The idea of a trillionaire somehow sounds unpleasant, perhaps.
I really don't think that that is a serious threat to openness, to innovativeness, to entrepreneurship. Now, I should say that there are historical cases, and I'm not sure how relevant they are to today. There are historical cases in which a small group of people, essentially, closed down the system. The Italian word is Serrata. The Serrata of Venice happened in the early 14th century, in which a small group of powerful families essentially closed the system and wouldn't let other people enter anymore.
If that's too well carried out, you eventually will see a major slowdown in the growth of the economy. It's perhaps not surprising that in the 15th and 16th centuries, Venice is still there, but they are no longer nearly as dominant as they were before. This is the recurrent theme. In the Netherlands, the same can be said. They're very dynamic and very creative in their golden age. God knows they're the wunderkind of Europe.
Then in the 18th century, all of a sudden, they're slowly losing their position, and they're not the place where the Industrial Revolution starts. The answer to that is, again, there's a small number of powerful families who concentrate all the wealth and all the political power, and they're able to close the system so that no new people can enter, and that is dangerous.
Bethany: You've written about what you've called, I think, the customary chasm between science and the mundane details of production. Is that the right explanation for why extraordinary AI capabilities haven't yet produced extraordinary economy-wide productivity? If that chasm historically took a century to close, then on what basis can anybody confidently forecast that an AI productivity boom is going to happen over the next 5 or 10 years?
I guess another way of asking this is: if today's apparent AI productivity paradox is simply normal historical delay, then what does the extraordinary scale of current investment mean? Can we afford to say, just wait a century for it to show up? [laughs]
Joel: I know. I know. It scares me, too, because I'm old enough to remember 2000 and the dot-com boom popping. There was actually a serious setback at the time, not quite as bad as 2008, but still pretty awful. I'm looking at the investment numbers today for AI, and just these power centers, and it worries me a great deal. I think it is something of a speculative bubble. Again, that is not abnormal.
If you look at the innovation of the greatest impact or one of the innovation of the greatest impact of the 19th century was railroads, and railroads was the start of a boom-and-bust alternation, and there's at least three major events in which the railroad industry went bust, and that led to firms failing and people going out of business, and some unemployment and lots of people losing lots of money. That's probably going to happen with AI as well, and therefore, it wouldn't break my heart if our budding trillionaire became just an ordinary billionaire.
Yes, I think the impact of AI on productivity, which you allude to, is going to be a lot more complicated. To what extent it is labor-saving as opposed to labor-augmenting remains very much up in the air. I do want to point out one important thing that gets lost in all the debate about AI, and that is most industrialized countries, and some non-industrialized countries, are going to be facing increasing labor scarcity.
Labor shortages are already popping up in lots of places. It's not just the fact that labor is not available, but that labor won't do certain jobs. Since the beginning of the new administration, we have lost 75,000 industrial jobs, even though the administration is going out of its way to encourage manufacturing. The reason is people don't want to work in factories any more than they want to work in the fields and pick strawberries, or any more than they want to work in construction, or they want to clean hotel rooms or wash dishes in restaurants. There are a whole bunch of jobs that people won't do.
Here is one of my big concerns, and that is we are facing a huge crisis with the aging of the population and that geriatric care, almost by definition, is very labor-intensive. Where are these workers going to come from? I have a little section about that in the paper I just put out in my Nobel lecture. It worries me a great deal because what has been done in an industrialized country to deal with this is bringing in immigrants.
If you go to nursing homes or similar institutions today, the number of foreign workers is enormous. The problem is that kind of resource is going to be exhausted because in many of these countries, population growth is down as well. India is now below replacement fertility, which is almost hair-raising. We will be facing labor shortages across the board. Really, apart from coming up with technologies that will mimic what people can do in some ways- these more and more human-like robots- without that, it's not clear how we're going to cope with this aging phenomenon.
The other issue, and I raised that also in my paper, is that we're facing an existential crisis with climate change. I think a consensus is emerging that the greatest hope for climate change is, in fact, technological advances that are based on the application of artificial intelligence. If it isn't for innovation, I really don't see what other way there is for us to deal with climate change in the next three or four decades. In that sense, you have no choice but to be a technological optimist. Because, otherwise, how are we going to deal with these crises?
I'll tell you exactly what worries me, perhaps more than anything else. For science to succeed, there has to be some way of trusting what scientists say. Scientists will keep a check on one another, but in the end, the people who are supposed to believe their stuff have to trust that. Most people think Einstein was right about relativity, but 99% of people who believe that have no clue about the kind of evidence and the kind of logic that's behind it, and that's the way it always works.
The problem, I think, is that that trust is a social construction that depends on ideology and could be fragile. One of the things that AI may do is reduce the boundaries of information and misinformation. In fact, we already see that in the political sphere very heavily, but we also see it in the medical sphere. A lot of misinformation is coming out. It's very difficult for people to make that distinction, and AI is aggravating that, and that worries me.
What I think we will need is some kind of government agency that people trust, that we know is something that we can really rely on. We had that to some extent with the scientific committees that were advisory to a whole bunch of government bodies making decisions, not just on medicine, but also on nuclear power and energy and environment and so on and so forth.
These scientific advisory committees have been systematically dismantled in the last 18 months for reasons that nobody can quite fathom because their cost was negligible. That means that people will have less and less trust. In fact, polls show that people trust science, and they still trust scientists to some extent, but less so than they did 20 years ago, and that worries me.
Remember one thing. Bloodletting was a good cure for infectious disease. It lived for 2,500 years. Somehow we never were able to get rid of that until deep into the 19th century. Now, that scares me. If you think that the market for ideas somehow works and that good knowledge eventually drives out bad knowledge, how come bleeding and other things related to it, like purging and so on and so forth, survived for 2,500 years?
God help us if we come up with some kind of fake idea that survives that long. 20 years ago, I wouldn't have thought that was possible. Now, with artificial intelligence and making things that are fake look true are really worrisome. Where will it be 20 years from now?
Bethany: On the topic of trust, in the world of biology, if changes are slow enough, the biological world adapts, and if not, it collapses. If trust is so important to human civilization and the rate of change brought by AI is so fast, is there any argument for slowing it down, for not allowing competition to flourish in order to increase trust?
Joel: No, I don't think so. I think we need to recognize the importance of trust. We should think about institutions that are immune to political pressure and to maybe corporate pressure. I'm just basically looking at the evidence and saying this is so and this is different, and here we don't know yet, and that they reflect only the public interest and the truth. These things are fragile because there are always interested parties that may not like the results.
I am against slowing it down. That is a classic case of throwing the baby with the bathwater. We need to accelerate it because demographic change and climate change are staring us in the face. There are other things that may, in fact, be as important breakthroughs as anything we've seen in the last 200 years. One of them, I think that we're almost getting there, is nuclear fusion. Nuclear fusion will be a source of essentially supplying energy at an infinitely elastic supply curve at some very low cost with no environmental impact that anybody knows of right now, at least. That is knocking on our door.
The other thing that may be no longer within the realm of imagination is extending life expectancy. There is now serious research, and that research is, of course, well-funded because these billionaires are all hoping to live forever. We are finally making serious breakthroughs in the biology of aging and cell senescence. When I tell this to my students, they start laughing, and I think it's science fiction. I remind them, as I'm sure everybody knows, that it's already happened, that life expectancy doubled in the last 150 years.
It still was somewhere around the lower 40s in the late 19th century. Then it starts shooting up somewhere around 1880 or 1890, depending on where you look, and we are now over 80. It doubled in 150 years. It could double again. Who would argue that infant and child mortality have, for all practical purposes, declined to zero? Who would have believed that in 1850? I'm a great believer that these goals are just in front of us. I will not live to see them, but they will be there.
Luigi: Now, you mentioned a couple of times, Elon Musk, but in your work, you seem to suggest that it's very important for innovation to take place, to have innovators protected from the state and from the abuse of the state, and to let them flourish and so on and so forth. Do you think that actually Elon Musk needs to be protected against the state, or what is different this time around?
Joel: I don't think he needs to be protected against the state. Maybe the state should be protected against Elon Musk. [laughs] I don't know. Look, the industry they're threatening- Musk, for instance- and this is a classic example of unwise policies, and not just by the current administration, by the way, is that we have essentially closed the United States to the importation of Chinese electric vehicles.
When you go to Europe, and you go to Europe a lot, I'm sure, what you see is, all of a sudden, there's all these electrical vehicles made in China, and they are cheap, and they are well-built, and they're competing very seriously with the kind of stuff that people like Elon Musk make. You don't see them in the United States because, essentially, they're kept out with a prohibitive tariff, which was passed by the Biden administration, if I'm not mistaken. That's a really bad idea.
The American automobile industry was saved in the 1960s by the importation of European and Japanese cars, which essentially forced them to get their act together, and they did survive. I think the same is true about EVs. We need to let foreign cars in, but there is a sense that some people accumulate so much wealth, and this is sort of the French Piketty group, Saez, Zucman, and so on, that these people control so much power and so much wealth that they may be able to close things off to competition, and that would worry me.
Bethany: This idea of "better technology plus worse institution" gives you basically Stasi with AI. I think that's really quite terrifying, and he doesn't have a resolution to that, maybe because there isn't one, but it casts his optimism in a very different light, or it's optimism with a heavy gray shadow hanging over it, right?
Luigi: Part of me would say maybe we define technology poorly. Technology is not just the latest gadget; technology is also a new method to share ideas. Legal institutions, like a limited liability corporation, with all its defects, has been a phenomenal technology. The problem is that in the political sphere, it seems that we are losing knowledge of this technology. In sciences, technology is cumulative. Short of a major wipeout of all the information, we're not going to go back to believe that the Earth is at the center of the universe, okay? Once we discover, we move forward. Yes, there are some people that still believe that the Earth is flat or whatever, but the vast majority of people move forward. It doesn't look like that in the political sphere.
Bethany: That's a really interesting point, and I think that leads to another point, which is that his proposed solution is this politically and corporately independent scientific authority so that people will have trust in it. Well, if trust is broken, then people aren't going to have trust in that authority, right? It seems to me that the foundational element here is trust, and if that's missing, then I don't know. Has any economist ever measured trust, come up with a good way to measure trust in a society, if that's what we're talking about here?
Luigi: Oh, yes, there's a lot of large literature.
Bethany: Oh.
Luigi: I've contributed to some of that, but the measures are not that great. I will distinguish the trust in the short term and the trust in the long term. The trust in the long term, people use a funny question that, do you agree that most people can be trusted? I think there is a huge variation going from Sweden that has a very high level to Brazil that is at the bottom of the distribution.
Then there is trust in institutions, which is slightly different because people can trust each other but not trust institutions. I think that the trust in institutions has plummeted, but again, I'm not so sure that you can blame the people who don't trust. The institutions have not been great. Let me tell you something that I'm not so sure is related, but I think is related, which is this: at a conference organized by the Stigler Center last weekend, there was an early paper showing the following factoids.
Over the last 40 years, Democrats have become more similar to each other; Republicans have not. You can measure robustness, et cetera. My, actually, latest idea, I'm throwing out because it's a half-baked idea, is the Democratic Party has created kind of a new religion. Many Republicans are religious, and so they don't need any religion. Most Democrats are not religious, so they created a new religion that comes with an intolerance vis-à-vis the non-religious because some of the faith in science that was shown during COVID had a religious intolerance that had nothing to do with science, because we know that science progresses one mistake at a time.
We know that mistakes are natural, necessary for the process, and that there is no certainty in science; there is only perfectibility, ability to improve. Especially at the heyday of Twitter, there was this intolerance that was professed by some scientists themselves.
Bethany: I don't think that this is a wild tangent at all. Actually, there were some people on Twitter, and I was a little bit part of this, arguing for a while that in our society, in particular on the left, politics has indeed substituted for religion. I guess the deeper underlying part of that would be that we find religion somewhere, and it can be an official religion, or it can be a subterranean religion.
People need to feel like they belong and like they belong to a tribe, and some of the ways of belonging on the left are very identical to religious belonging, so I think that's unquestionably true. It made me start thinking as a lifelong skeptic of religion, or somebody who is focused on the damage it can do. It made me start thinking, "Well, maybe an official religion is better than a subterranean one." If Karl Marx said religion is the opiate of the people, an unacknowledged religion is even more of an opiate, right?
Luigi: Is the fentanyl.
[laughter]
Bethany: Yes, oh my God, yes. An unacknowledged religion is the fentanyl of the people.
Luigi: How can we fix that? Because I think that Mokyr is right. The biggest problem is the lack of tolerance. He said it beautifully that 99% of the wacky ideas are wacky, but 1%, maybe even less than 1%, is phenomenally good, and that 1% pays for more than all the other wacky ones. As a society, we would like to have tolerance, but the ironic thing, as an economist, I think that many social norms have a functional aspect, but here it seems completely dysfunctional. It's a norm that pushes us to be the same, not to deviate, when as a society, we really benefit from deviation.
Bethany: Yes, I think it's just hard. I think the kind of tolerance that you're preaching runs antithetical to what most humans crave. I can even see it myself sometimes. You want to belong, and you want other people to echo the point of view that you're putting forward and fighting against that, and retaining the capacity to have other people disagree and to say, "Okay," it's a daily practice, I think.
There was one other thing Mokyr said that I thought you would disagree with. He's just surprisingly relaxed about huge corporations. Do you think that his sanguinity is deserved today? Yes, I hear his argument. Kodak didn't last. Other companies came along, but we're in a very different era now than we were when Eastman Kodak fell apart. I felt a little bit like he was trapped in the past and perhaps not aware enough of the dangers of today's monopolies.
Luigi: He's trapped in the past for two reasons. Number one, his parents escaped the Holocaust with the fear of the government as being the most aggressive enemy of all. When you are traumatized by something like this, it's very hard to change your mind. Two, he studied technology and technological evolution, and his key elements are the beginning of the Industrial Revolution and the period leading to the big corporation.
I don't think he's a scholar of the period of The Great Gatsby and the Gilded Age, and how difficult it was because he's right that this was fixed. However, he made it sound like, "Oh, no big deal." I'm not a scholar of this period, but my reading of this period was a bit of a lucky strike of the United States. One, really, strike of luck was the fact that McKinley was assassinated because Theodore Roosevelt became president.
Theodore Roosevelt was against the large corporations, but he would never have been elected president in that Republican Party. He was offered the vice presidency, and he said, "I know this is a useless job, but I'm too ambitious to say no." Then he became president. I think that that is really a strike of luck at the right moment. Also, the way the United States dealt with the Great Depression, the fact that there was a Roosevelt that conveyed a lot of that resentment, instability, and into some market reforms was a blessing because, to some extent, the same problem in Germany led to the Nazis. There were some Nazis' tricks in the United States as well. It's not that this would have been impossible. It didn't happen. We only have one history, and we have a lucky history. This didn't happen.
Bethany: I've probably been infected by my work with you in the Stigler Center. I was also talking to a senior business person the other day who was also just really worried about monopolies and how difficult, in fact, impossible, it was to do anything to challenge them. That form of stagnation, it's not just the political environment that is important for technological innovation to go in the right direction; it's also the corporate environment, right? That ground, if you will, or that seeding for what's happening today is not necessarily reassuring.
Luigi: He seems to underestimate the risk of an Elon Musk or somebody like that being very powerful in the government. When power is too concentrated, you end up having either the government be run by the oligarch or the government taking over the oligarch and nationalizing. There's nothing in between because if you are the government, you know that if you don't take them over, they take you over, so it becomes a game of chicken, of who starts first.
Bethany: Yes, Russia, right? A very, very recent example.
Luigi: Absolutely. Also, Mexico. Mexico, for a long time, had a very strong oil industry, and at some point, the Mexican government nationalized the oil industry. Why did they nationalize it? It was not because they thought that it was better run by the government, all the stuff that normally are explained for nationalization. This is simply that it was such a powerful industry that if you are controlling that industry, you are controlling the government, so if you are in the government, you want to control the industry because otherwise you are controlled.
Bethany: I don't know how we tie this into our discussion about religion, but I guess maybe everything in human life is a struggle for belonging, but at the same time a struggle for supremacy, right? [laughs]
Luigi: That's definitely true. That's definitely true. Matt, what else?
Matt Hodapp: What happens if one of these AI companies actually develops a pill that lets you live forever? Do they control the government, or does the government control them?
Luigi: If they are the monopoly on the pill, they will give it only to the people they like, so they definitely will control the entire country. Let's talk about living forever. It was very inspiring, the optimism that he had about prolonging our life, which, by the way, makes his concern about fertility less problematic because if we live much, much longer, we should have fewer children; otherwise, there are too many people on the planet. I think the two things compensate each other.
Bethany: Not quite. Not quite. Only if we live much longer and have much more productive lives for much longer. Because if the dynamic continues to be lopsided and there are all these old people and only a few young people working to support them, then the whole thing goes haywire. Yes, but it has to be living longer and staying productive for much longer.
Luigi: Yes. No, of course. I think that people are being productive for longer. Think about it. For a kid, you spend the first 20, 25 years being non-productive because you're learning. Increase the life expectancy of people, and they don't become completely senile; then you have a higher return on investment in education, and so you can afford to have fewer children, in my view.
Bethany: Yes. No, I agree with that. I really liked his optimism around AI being able to both care for people and extend lives. I'm 55, and I don't feel close to being done yet.
[laughter]
Bethany: I like the idea of lifespan being extended. You?
Luigi: Absolutely. The problem is that I'm not so sure it arrives in time for us. Certainly, it arrives in time for Matt, but not for us.
[laughter]
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