Faculty & Research

Rimmy Tomy

Assistant Professor of Accounting

Phone :
1-773-834-1722
Address :
5807 South Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637

Rimmy E. Tomy’s research interests include financial reporting, bank accounting, regulation, and auditing. Her research focuses on the impact of regulatory intervention on firms' financial reporting and real activities, and the role of external monitors such as auditors and regulators in corporate oversight and governance.

Professor Tomy earned her Ph.D. in Accounting from the Stanford Graduate School of Business. She holds an MS in Accounting from the University of Colorado at Boulder, a post graduate diploma in Finance and Accounting from Xavier Institute of Management, and a BS from St. Stephen’s College, University of Delhi.

Outside of academia, Professor Tomy has previous corporate experience working at Ernst & Young LLP and McKinsey & Company.

 

2017 - 2018 Course Schedule

Number Name Quarter
30000 Financial Accounting 2018 (Spring)

REVISION: Repatriation Taxes and Foreign Cash Holdings: The Impact of Anticipated Tax Reform
Date Posted: Dec  08, 2017
We examine whether anticipation of a repatriation tax reduction affects the amount of cash U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) hold overseas. We find that U.S. MNCs most likely to benefit from a repatriation tax reduction accumulated significant cash holdings once Congress proposed legislation, at the expense of reduced shareholder payouts, relative to firms unlikely to benefit. This behavior was accompanied by complementary activities designed to maximize expected tax benefits. We contribute to the literature on how firms respond to tax-induced incentives, provide a new explanation for U.S. MNC cash holding growth, and raise questions about the consequences of U.S. tax reform.

New: Competition and the Use of Discretion in Financial Reporting: Evidence from Community Banks
Date Posted: Jan  24, 2017
This paper examines how an increase in the threat of competition distorts firms' financial reporting. I consider two channels: actions taken by managers as well as by regulators. Using state-level changes in branching regulation, I find that geographically-constrained community banks increased their loss provisions and appeared less profitable when faced with the threat of entry by competitors. Future losses do not justify the increase in provisions. The effect is consistent with both managers' and regulators' use of discretion in financial reporting, driven by managers' entry-deterrence objective and regulators' mandate to ensure safety and soundness of the financial system. Survey-based evidence collected as part of this study supports the premise that banks prefer to locate in markets where incumbents have high profitability and low credit losses, and that banks use competitors' financial statements in analyzing their competition. Survey evidence also suggests that ...