Jessica Jeffers

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Tue, 30 Mar 2021 11:38:35 -0500
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), few impact funds tie compensation directly to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. However, funds contract directly on impact in other ways and adjust aspects of the contracts like governance. In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals.

REVISION: Labor Reactions to Credit Deterioration: Evidence from LinkedIn Activity
Date Posted:Mon, 14 Sep 2020 03:04:42 -0500
We examine workers’ reactions to signals of their firms’ credit deterioration using anonymized networking activity on LinkedIn. Connection formation significantly increases after firms are placed on negative credit watch. We document labor reactions to credit events across the entire distribution of credit ratings, and propose a human capital risk channel to explain why workers respond even when the firm is far from default. Connection activity is associated with more contemporaneous and future departures, and also significant for those that remain, consistent with a precautionary motive for networking. Furthermore, we find reactions are stronger for senior and skilled workers. Firms with stronger labor reactions to credit events also experience worse turnover and profitability, up to one year after the event.

REVISION: Labor Reactions to Credit Deterioration: Evidence from LinkedIn Activity
Date Posted:Thu, 06 Aug 2020 04:18:27 -0500
We examine workers' reactions to signals of their firms' credit deterioration using anonymized networking activity on LinkedIn. We show significant increases in weekly connection formation after firms are placed on negative credit watch or downgraded. Other negative events like missed earnings and equity sell recommendations do not trigger similar changes in networking activity, and results are not limited to firms in imminent financial distress. Our results appear consistent with a precautionary motive for networking. We find connection-making is associated with higher concurrent and future departures, though it also goes up for employees who stay. Reactions are stronger for more senior and skilled employees.

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Wed, 22 Jul 2020 03:21:38 -0500
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), few impact funds tie compensation directly to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. However, funds contract directly on impact in other ways and adjust aspects of the contracts like governance. In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals.

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Mon, 13 Jul 2020 03:32:28 -0500
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), few impact funds tie compensation directly to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. However, funds contract directly on impact in other ways and adjust aspects of the contracts like governance. In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals.

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Fri, 08 May 2020 03:15:41 -0500
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), few impact funds tie compensation directly to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. However, funds contract directly on impact in other ways and adjust aspects of the contracts like governance. In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals. We propose an explanatory framework in which this feature results from hidden differences between agents’ preferences over impact.

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Thu, 07 May 2020 03:41:04 -0500
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), few impact funds tie compensation directly to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. However, funds contract directly on impact in other ways and adjust aspects of the contracts like governance. In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals. We propose an explanatory framework in which this feature results from hidden differences between agents’ preferences over impact.

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Tue, 28 Apr 2020 03:43:09 -0500
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private market contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), few impact funds tie compensation directly to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. However, funds contract directly on impact in other ways and adjust aspects of the contracts like governance. In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals. We propose an explanatory framework in which this feature results from hidden differences between agents’ preferences over impact.

REVISION: Labor Reactions to Credit Deterioration: Evidence from LinkedIn Activity
Date Posted:Fri, 17 Jan 2020 04:43:22 -0600
We examine workers' reactions to signals of their firms' credit deterioration using anonymized networking activity on LinkedIn. We show significant increases in weekly connection formation following the announcement of a negative credit watch. More senior and more skilled workers have the strongest reactions, and increased connection activity appears for both workers who leave and workers who stay at the firm. Positive credit news and non-credit economic news like missed earnings do not trigger similar changes in networking activity. Our results appear consistent with a precautionary motive for networking.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Sat, 04 Jan 2020 09:38:45 -0600
This paper examines how labor frictions affect investment rate and new firm entry. Using matched employee-employer data from LinkedIn, I first show that increases in the enforceability of non-compete agreements lead to widespread declines in employee departures across seniority levels, driven by workers in knowledge-intensive occupations. Investment rates at existing firms increase, especially for firms that employ more skilled workers. This comes at the expense of new firm entry, which declines substantially in knowledge-intensive sectors. The results suggest that labor frictions play an important role in investment decisions, and that NCs may factor into slowing business dynamism.

REVISION: Contracts with (Social) Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Mon, 09 Dec 2019 07:06:27 -0600
We draw on new data and theory to examine how private equity contracts adapt to serve multiple goals, particularly the social-benefit goals that impact funds add to their financial goals. Counter to the intuition from multitasking models (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), few impact funds tie compensation to impact, and most retain traditional financial incentives. Funds contract on impact in other ways, using a combination of flexible and rigid terms consistent with Hart and Moore (2008). They also prioritize the formal oversight that fuels the braiding dynamic of Gilson, Sabel and Scott (2010). In the cross-section of impact funds, those with higher profit goals contract more tightly around both goals. We propose an explanatory framework where this results from hidden differences between agents’ utilities from impact.

REVISION: Labor Reactions to Financial Distress: Evidence from LinkedIn Activity
Date Posted:Thu, 31 Oct 2019 04:55:35 -0500
We investigate workers' reactions to signals of their firms' financial condition using anonymized networking activity on LinkedIn. We show significant increases in weekly connection formation following the announcement of possible impending downgrades to a firm's credit rating. More senior, more skilled, and less mobile workers have the strongest reactions, but increased connection activity appears in both workers who leave and workers who stay at the firm. Reactions to firms' financial conditions are asymmetric: we do not find evidence of a change in networking activity for positive credit rating news. We also do not find similar reactions following economic signals such as missed earnings. These results point to possible unique labor implications of debt financing.

REVISION: Labor Reactions to Financial Distress: Evidence from LinkedIn Activity
Date Posted:Thu, 10 Oct 2019 06:42:59 -0500
We investigate workers' reactions to signals of their firms' financial condition using anonymized networking activity on LinkedIn. We show significant increases in weekly connection formation following the announcement of possible impending downgrades to a firm's credit rating. More senior, more skilled, and less mobile workers have the strongest reactions, but increased connection activity appears in both workers who leave and workers who stay at the firm. Reactions to firms' financial conditions are asymmetric: we do not find evidence of a change in networking activity for positive credit rating news. We also do not find similar reactions following economic signals such as missed earnings. These results point to possible unique labor implications of debt financing.

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Sun, 28 Jul 2019 05:39:38 -0500
Impact investing adds a social-benefit goal to the usual financial goal of investing. The additional goal complicates the alignment of incentives through layers of agency, and raises the question of how contracting practices should adapt. We draw on legal documents from impact funds to address this adaptation empirically, and relate it to contract theory. We find that the contracts with both portfolio companies and investors use new terms to directly operationalize impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on governance and compensation. Moreover, funds’ direct contracting on impact with investors passes through to their contracting with portfolio companies.

New: Corporate Culture As an Implicit Contract
Date Posted:Fri, 26 Jul 2019 05:39:16 -0500
We develop a measure of corporate culture using coworker connectivity on LinkedIn's platform, and show it is strongly correlated with positive employee relations and satisfaction. Using state-level changes to employment agreements as shocks to explicit contracts, we find that these changes significantly impact employees in weakly connected firms, but have little to no effect on those at strongly connected firms. Our results suggest that firms with strong corporate culture are less dependent on explicit contracts to retain human capital. We document implications for firms' investment decisions and other outcomes.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Tue, 09 Jul 2019 15:18:23 -0500
This paper finds that increased restrictions on labor mobility generate a substantial trade-off between entrepreneurial activity and capital investment. Using LinkedIn's database of employment histories and occupations combined with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements, results show that stronger non-compete enforceability systematically leads to a widespread decline in employee departures, driven by workers in knowledge-intensive occupations. Departures to new firms decline substantially. In turn, new firm entry in corresponding sectors decreases. The trade-off is that the investment rate at existing firms increases sharply, driven by firms that employ knowledge-intensive workers.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Sun, 23 Jun 2019 04:34:46 -0500
This paper finds that increased restrictions on labor mobility generate a substantial trade-off between entrepreneurial activity and capital investment. Using LinkedIn's database of employment histories and occupations combined with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements, results show that stronger non-compete enforceability systematically leads to a widespread decline in employee departures, driven by workers in knowledge-intensive occupations. Departures to new firms especially seem to decline. In turn, new firm entry in corresponding sectors decreases. The trade-off is that the investment rate at existing firms increases sharply, driven by firms that employ knowledge-intensive workers.

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Wed, 06 Mar 2019 13:20:24 -0600
Impact investing private equity and venture capital funds are a rapidly emerging force in capital markets, premised on the service of two goals at once: a financial goal as well as a social-benefit goal. The addition of this second objective complicates the already challenging problem of aligning incentives across layers of agency, and raises the question of how contracting practices should adapt. We draw on contract theory and a unique set of legal documents from impact funds to answer this both normatively and positively. Contracts struck by impact funds, both forward to portfolio companies and back to investors, use new terms to directly operationalize impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on governance, investor protection, and other concerns to facilitate it. Moreover, funds’ direct contracting on impact with investors passes through to their contracting with portfolio companies. For the most part, observed contracting terms align with theory, though they also differ ...

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Thu, 01 Nov 2018 14:54:53 -0500
Impact investing private equity and venture capital funds are a rapidly emerging force in capital markets, premised on the service of two goals at once: a financial goal as well as a social-benefit goal. The addition of this second objective complicates the already challenging problem of aligning incentives across layers of agency, and raises the question of how contracting practices should adapt. We draw on contract theory and a unique set of legal documents from impact funds to answer this both normatively and positively. Contracts struck by impact funds, both forward to portfolio companies and back to investors, use new terms to directly operationalize impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on governance, investor protection, and other concerns to facilitate it. Moreover, funds’ direct contracting on impact with investors passes through to their contracting with portfolio companies. For the most part, observed contracting terms align with theory, though they also differ ...

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Thu, 20 Sep 2018 07:13:23 -0500
The Private Equity/Venture Capital industry has developed contracting practices that align incentives for value creation while addressing agency problems. Impact investing adds social benefits to the value a fund aims to create, raising the question of how impact funds should adapt contracting practices optimized for monetary goals. We address this question by analyzing contracts struck by impact funds, both forward to portfolio companies and back to investors, and find that the contracts incorporate new terms directly operationalizing impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on compensation, governance, investor protection and other concerns to facilitate it.

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Sun, 01 Jul 2018 23:49:05 -0500
The Private Equity/Venture Capital industry has developed contracting practices that align incentives for value creation while addressing agency problems. Impact investing adds social benefits to the value a fund aims to create, raising the question of how impact funds should adapt contracting practices optimized for monetary goals. We address this question by analyzing contracts struck by impact funds, both forward to portfolio companies and back to investors, and find that the contracts incorporate new terms directly operationalizing impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on compensation, governance, investor protection and other concerns to facilitate it.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Sat, 12 May 2018 05:29:08 -0500
I investigate the impact of restricting labor mobility on two components of growth: entrepreneurship and capital investment. To identify the mechanism, I combine LinkedIn's database of employment histories with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements that come mostly from court rulings. Stronger enforceability leads to a substantial decline in employee departures, especially in knowledge-intensive occupations, and reduces entrepreneurship in corresponding sectors. However, these shocks increase the investment rate at existing knowledge-intensive firms. The estimates in my sample suggest that, in such sectors, there is roughly $1.8 million of additional capital investment from publicly-held firms for every lost new firm entry.

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Thu, 10 May 2018 03:12:03 -0500
The Private Equity/Venture Capital industry has developed contracting practices that align incentives for value creation while addressing agency problems. Impact investing adds social benefits to the value a fund aims to create, raising the question of how impact funds should adapt contracting practices optimized for monetary goals. We address this question by analyzing contracts struck by impact funds, both forward to portfolio companies and back to investors, and find that the contracts incorporate new terms directly operationalizing impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on compensation, governance, investor protection and other concerns to facilitate it.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Sun, 06 May 2018 08:47:30 -0500
I investigate the impact of restricting labor mobility on two components of growth: entrepreneurship and capital investment. To identify the mechanism, I combine LinkedIn's database of employment histories with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements that come mostly from state supreme court rulings. Stronger enforceability leads to a substantial decline in employee departures, especially in knowledge-intensive occupations, and reduces entrepreneurship in corresponding sectors. However, these shocks increase the investment rate at existing knowledge-intensive firms. The estimates in my sample suggest that, in such sectors, there is roughly $2 million of additional capital investment from publicly-held firms for every lost new firm entry.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Mon, 30 Apr 2018 08:37:50 -0500
I investigate the impact of restricting labor mobility on two components of growth: entrepreneurship and capital investment. To identify the mechanism, I combine LinkedIn's database of employment histories with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements that come mostly from state supreme court rulings. Stronger enforceability leads to a substantial decline in employee departures, especially in knowledge-intensive occupations, and reduces entrepreneurship in corresponding sectors. However, these shocks increase the investment rate at existing knowledge-intensive firms. The estimates in my sample suggest that, in such sectors, there is roughly $2 million of additional capital investment from publicly-held firms for every lost new firm entry.

REVISION: Contracts with Benefits: The Implementation of Impact Investing
Date Posted:Thu, 26 Apr 2018 07:07:04 -0500
The Private Equity/Venture Capital industry has developed contracting practices that align incentives for value creation while addressing agency problems. Impact investing adds social benefits to the value a fund aims to create, raising the question of how impact funds should adapt contracting practices optimized for monetary goals. We address this question by analyzing contracts struck by impact funds, both forward to portfolio companies and back to investors, and find that the contracts incorporate new terms directly operationalizing impact, and also adjust the use of existing terms on compensation, governance, investor protection and other concerns to facilitate it.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Fri, 23 Feb 2018 10:23:45 -0600
I investigate the impact of restricting labor mobility on two components of growth: entrepreneurship and capital investment. To identify the mechanism, I combine LinkedIn's database of employment histories with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements that come mostly from state supreme court rulings. Stronger enforceability leads to a substantial decline in employee departures, especially in knowledge-intensive occupations, and reduces entrepreneurship in corresponding sectors. However, these shocks increase the investment rate at existing knowledge-intensive firms. The estimates in my sample suggest that, in such sectors, there is roughly $2 million of additional capital investment from publicly-held firms for every lost new firm entry.

REVISION: The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate Investment and Entrepreneurship
Date Posted:Sun, 24 Sep 2017 03:27:19 -0500
I investigate the impact of restricting labor mobility on two components of growth: entrepreneurship and capital investment. To identify the mechanism, I combine LinkedIn's database of employment histories with staggered changes in the enforceability of non-compete agreements that come mostly from state supreme court rulings. Stronger enforceability leads to a substantial decline in employee departures, especially in knowledge-intensive occupations, and reduces entrepreneurship in corresponding sectors. However, these shocks increase the investment rate at existing knowledge-intensive firms. The estimates in my sample suggest that, in such sectors, there is roughly $1.5 million of additional capital investment from publicly-held firms for every lost new firm entry.

REVISION: In Pursuit of Good & Gold: Data Observations of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment
Date Posted:Thu, 29 Jun 2017 04:54:58 -0500
A startup’s path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees’ incentives to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance the goal of profitability with another goal — the goal of good — the risks are likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore contracting terms specific to impact investing funds and their portfolio companies. We observe one possible private ordering mechanism to balance and align interests to serve both goals: employee ownership. Traditional VC investments confront contracting challenges as the portfolio companies and investors balance their interests, which may not align. Additionally, portfolio companies are ...

REVISION: In Pursuit of Good & Gold: Data Observations of Employee Ownership & Impact Investment
Date Posted:Fri, 10 Mar 2017 00:27:32 -0600
A startup’s path to self-sustaining profitability is risky and hard, and most do not make it. Venture capital (VC) investors try to improve these odds with contractual terms that focus and sharpen employees’ incentives to pursue gold. If the employees and investors expect the startup to balance the goal of profitability with another goal — the goal of good — the risks are likely to both grow and multiply. They grow to the extent that profits are threatened, and they multiply to the extent that balancing competing goals adds a dimension to the incentive problem. In this Article, we explore contracting terms specific to impact investing funds and their portfolio companies. We observe one possible private ordering mechanism to balance and align interests to serve both goals: employee ownership. Traditional VC investments confront contracting challenges as the portfolio companies and investors balance their interests, which may not align. Additionally, portfolio companies are ...

New: Great Expectations: Mission Preservation and Financial Performance in Impact Investing
Date Posted:Tue, 26 Jan 2016 12:12:38 -0600
Over the past decade, limited partners have increased capital allocations to socially driven private equity funds with the goal to generate long-term impact alongside financial returns. To understand funds' abilities to meet these goals, we gather detailed mission and financial data from 53 impact investing private equity funds, representing 557 individual investments. In our sample we find that while fund managers are overwhelmingly optimistic about mission preservation, few exits have any contractual statements about preserving mission. Regarding financial performance, our set of market-rate-seeking funds achieved gross results comparable to non-impact investment options along a broad range of measures, suggesting it is possible to generate market returns as an impact fund.

REVISION: Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme
Date Posted:Tue, 28 Apr 2015 07:26:57 -0500
Institutional investors, with trillions in assets under management, hold increasingly important stakes in public companies and fund individual retirement for many Americans, making institutional investors’ behaviors and preferences paramount determinants of capital allocations and the economy. In this paper, we examine high fiduciary duty institutions' (HFDIs') response to decreased profit maximization pressure as measured by the effect of constituency statutes on HFDI investment. We ask this question, in part, to anticipate HFDIs’ response to alternative purpose firms, like benefit corporations. Only with access to institutional investors’ capital can alternative purpose firms gain economic significance to rival the purely for-profit corporation. In our empirical study, we ask whether decreased profit maximization pressure, as evidenced by expanded director discretion to pursue nonshareholder interests, affected HFDIs’ decision to invest (or remain invested) in firms incorporated ...

REVISION: Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme
Date Posted:Sat, 25 Apr 2015 06:18:04 -0500
Institutional investors, with trillions in assets under management, hold increasingly important stakes in public companies and fund individual retirement for many Americans, making institutional investors’ behaviors and preferences paramount determinants of capital allocations and the economy. In this paper, we examine high fiduciary duty institutions' (HFDIs') response to decreased profit maximization pressure as measured by the effect of constituency statutes on HFDI investment. We ask this question, in part, to anticipate HFDIs’ response to alternative purpose firms, like benefit corporations. Only with access to institutional investors’ capital can alternative purpose firms gain economic significance to rival the purely for-profit corporation. In our empirical study, we ask whether decreased profit maximization pressure, as evidenced by expanded director discretion to pursue nonshareholder interests, affected HFDIs’ decision to invest (or remain invested) in firms incorporated ...

REVISION: Institutional Investing When Shareholders Are Not Supreme
Date Posted:Thu, 26 Mar 2015 02:18:19 -0500
Institutional investors, with trillions in assets under management, hold increasingly important stakes in public companies and fund individual retirement for many Americans, making institutional investors’ behaviors and preferences paramount determinants of capital allocations and the economy. In this paper, we examine high fiduciary duty institutions' (HFDIs') response to decreased profit maximization pressure as measured by the effect of constituency statutes on HFDI investment. We ask this question, in part, to anticipate HFDIs’ response to alternative purpose firms, like benefit corporations. Only with access to institutional investors’ capital can alternative purpose firms gain economic significance to rival the purely for-profit corporation. In our empirical study, we ask whether decreased profit maximization pressure, as evidenced by expanded director discretion to pursue nonshareholder interests, affected HFDIs’ decision to invest (or remain invested) in firms incorporated ...