Øystein Daljord studies quantitative marketing. His research is on empirical dynamic pricing and distribution channels. His research has appeared in the Journal of Marketing Research, International Review of Economics, Quantitative Economics, and Quantitative Marketing and Economics.
Daljord earned a Ph.D. in marketing from Stanford Graduate School of Business and an MSc in economics from the London School of Economics. From the University of Oslo, he holds a Cand. Mag, Interdisciplinary degree from the Department of Economics, Department of History and Philosophy and Department of Mathematics.
New: Homogenous Contracts for Heterogeneous Agents: Aligning Salesforce Composition and Compensation
Observed contracts in the real-world are often very simple, partly reflecting the constraints faced by contracting firms in making the contracts more complex. We focus on one such rigidity, the constraints faced by firms in fine-tuning contracts to the full distribution of heterogeneity of its employees. We explore the implication of these restrictions for the provision of incentives within the firm. Our application is to salesforce compensation, in which a firm maintains a salesforce to market its products. Consistent with ubiquitous real-world business practice, we assume the firm is restricted to fully or partially set uniform commissions across its agent pool. We show this implies an interaction between the composition of agent types in the contract and the compensation policy used to motivate them, leading to a “contractual externality” in the firm and generating gains to sorting. This paper explains how this contractual externality arises, discusses a practical approach to ...