John M. Barrios’ general research interests focus on the intersection of labor economics and financial and managerial accounting. Specifically, his research has examined the areas of human capital, financial reporting, regulation, managerial incentives, and corporate governance. In addition to his research he has experience as an economic analyst for a political strategist.
Barrios earned his Ph.D. in Accounting from the University of Miami. During his time in the Ph.D. program, he was awarded the KPMG Scholarship from the KPMG Foundation. Additionally, he holds a Masters in Professional Accounting from the University of Miami and a B.S. in Industrial and Labor Relations from Cornell University.
His hobbies and interests include reading, politics, cooking, fly-fishing, and salsa dancing.
2016 - 2017 Course Schedule
REVISION: Keeping Boards Close to Home: Frictions in the Corporate Director Labor Market
We examine the global market for corporate directors using data on cross-border appointments in public firms from 38 countries. We find that director appointments between countries are positively related to the countries’ economic significance and geographic proximity, and negatively to their differences in legal institutions and cultural values. We examine whether these frictions that affect the director market differ from those that affect international trade, migration, and foreign investment flows and find that while cultural differences facilitate trade flows they impede director flows. Our findings provide additional evidence as to the limitations of relying on globalization in trade and director reputation to drive improvements in corporate governance internationally.
REVISION: Occupational Licensing and Accountant Quality: Evidence from Linkedin
I use the staggered state-level adoption of the 150-hour Rule (the Rule) as a natural experiment along with the career histories of professional accountants’ from LinkedIn to examine the effects of mandatory occupational licensure on the individual quality of Certified Public Accountants (CPAs). Using a difference-in-difference and synthetic control research design, I document that the Rule marginally increases CPA exam pass rates and reduced the candidate supply, leading to an overall decline in the number of successful candidates. My analysis of LinkedIn data shows that individuals subject to the Rule are more likely to be employed at a Big 4 public accounting firm and specialize in taxation. However, Rule individuals have the same likelihood of promotion, the same duration until promotion, and exit public accounting at faster rates than their non-Rule counterparts. These findings suggest that restrictive licensing laws reduced the supply of new CPAs while failing to effectively ...
New: Is Corporate Social Responsibility an Agency Problem? Evidence from CEO Turnovers
We empirically examine two competing claims: first, if a firm’s Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activity is driven by its CEO’s private rent extraction (i.e. an agency problem), firms with higher CSR ratings are poorly governed and their managers are less likely to be dismissed for poor financial performance. In contrast, if CSR reflects owners’ preferences, CEOs of firms with higher CSR ratings are more likely to be removed in light of poor financial performance. We find that CEO turnover-financial performance sensitivity increases in firm CSR scores during the last years of both the outgoing CEO as well as his predecessor. Further, firm CSR ratings do not change following CEO turnover suggesting that CSR ratings are a firm characteristic. Our findings are consistent with the view that CSR is driven by shareholder preferences.
REVISION: CEO Turnover & Earnings Management: Do Family Ties Matter?
Using a hand-collected sample of Italian family and non-family-controlled firms, we investigate the moderating effect of family ownership on the relation between earnings management and CEO turnover. Consistent with agency theory, we find a positive and significant relation between earnings management and CEO turnover in the overall sample, the association being primarily driven by non-family-controlled firms. In family-controlled firms, we find that the positive relation is reduced. Furthermore, we find the association to be insignificant in cases where the CEO is a member of the controlling family. Robustness tests rule out competing hypotheses that differences in the propensity of family and non-family firms to manage earnings and ownership concentration drive our results. Overall, this study contributes to our understanding of family ownership driven differences in corporate governance systems, a relatively unexamined topic in the literature.