Dr. Tianna Barnes is a postdoctoral fellow in the Organizational Behavior group at The Wharton School. Her research explores how people manage multiple social identities, with an emphasis on group membership perceptions. With this, she explores two broader questions: 1) How do non-work and work-related group memberships interact? 2) What are the work consequences and managerial implications of those interactions?

Abstract:

Tianna Barnes, University of Pennsylvania
John Kammeyer-Mueller, University of Minnesota

Current moral identity literature acknowledges differences in moral sources yet overlooks the potential consequences of those differences. Borrowing from trait activation theory and developing the dual moral motivation model, we examine what effect moral identity has on individual moral motivations and behaviors, given different moral sources. To test our model, we compare abstract sources of a moral identity that broadly reflect moral values (i.e., abstract moral identities; AMI) to specific moral sources that directly reflect a person’s social identity group (i.e., social moral identities; SMI). Across three experimental studies, we find that when an individual’s salient moral source was only an abstract reflection of morality, that their moral identity was then more restrictive and less predictive of moral expressions towards others. With this work, we introduce a social moral identity as a type of moral identification that is uniquely distinct from both a salient social identity and the current use of moral identity in the literature.
make people see systemic injustice and collectively mobilize for change. She investigates this in several contexts, including in corporations, labor unions, and economic games.

Abstract:

**Don't hate the player, hate the game: When do people see and sanction system-level injustice?**

Grace Flores-Robles, City University of New York
Ana Gantman, City University of New York

When an injustice occurs, people tend to think about wrongdoing one of two ways; they see injustice as the result of a bad apple (i.e., one corrupt person) or a bad climate (i.e., a corrupt system; Gantman & Paluck, in press). In this research, we explored whether people notice a bad climate and, if they do, how they seek to sanction it. To test this, we significantly modified Dictator Game (Camerer, 2003), such that participants saw evidence of a bad apple (few people make very unfair offers) or bad climate (most people make slightly unfair offers; both had a mean unfairness of 4) and subsequently made judgments about whether the rules of the game should be changed. Across 4 studies (N = 345), we found that participants were unable to recognize a climate of injustice in our economic game, even when we explicitly described what it would look like. Among those who did recognize injustice, a desire to change the rules of the game for subsequent players differed based on one's pre-existing worldviews; participants low in just-world beliefs believed the rules should be changed regardless of the type of injustice that they witnessed, whereas participants high in just-world beliefs wanted to change the rules only when they saw evidence of a bad climate. These results suggest that the ways we frame social problems matter, not only for how people see injustice, but also for how they sanction the systems that perpetuate it.

Jordan Wylie
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Jordan Wylie is a postdoctoral researcher at Boston College. She received her PhD in Psychology with a concentration in Quantitative Methods from The Graduate School, CUNY in Summer 2022. Her research broadly investigates how morality shapes how we see, reason, and make judgments about our worlds. Specifically, she investigates how moral rules and norms influence judgments about rule breakers and the kinds of moral minds we are drawn to and interested in exploring. She is also affiliated with the Center for the Science of Moral Understanding and was a Research Fellow at the think tank More in Common where her work focused on the intersection of morality and politics.

Abstract:

**Descriptive norms and identity influence enforcement of rarely followed rules**

Jordan Wylie, Boston College
Ana Gantman, PhD, City University of New York

On any given day, you may notice people casually jaywalking or loitering. Although these behaviors are both frequent and morally irrelevant, they are also illegal. This kind of violation, which we call a phantom rule violation, is one that is rarely but selectively enforced—sometimes with extreme consequences. Across seven experiments (N =32,249) we validated the existence of
phantom rules, found evidence for their motivated enforcement, and found that they affect how people reason about cause. In a novel economic game, we found that people enforce a phantom rule (here, making fractional offers) more often when the rule violator acts selfishly compared to when they act fairly, though both are within the rules of the game. People also judge phantom rule violations in the legal system (e.g., jaywalking, pirating music), but not more prototypical legal violations (e.g., running a stop sign, identity theft) to be more justifiably punished when the rule violator has also violated a social norm (vs. rule violation alone)—unless the motivation to punish in the third-party observer has already been satiated.

These patterns also emerge in the real-world: We found that when New York City police respond to 311 calls (non-emergency issues like illegal vending or noise complaints) in majority White neighborhoods, the likelihood that those calls end in arrest dramatically decreases compared to when they respond to calls in minority White neighborhoods. Finally, we also found evidence that the cause of phantom rule enforcement is reasoned about in distinct ways. In contrast to frequently enforced rules, people are more likely to point to the enforcer of a phantom rule as the cause of the ensuing punishment rather than the rule breaker. Taken together, we find that phantom rules—seldom followed, rarely punished rules—highlight how norms and moral motives interact to determine highly consequential punishment decisions, with implications for causal judgments and understanding racial bias in the U.S. legal system.

Daniel Yonas
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Daniel Yonas is a 3rd year doctoral student at Columbia University. His research centers on how children and adults morally reason, how this process changes over the course of the lifespan, and how moral judgments influence behavior. His recent work examines moral cognition within the context of intergroup relations.

Abstract:

Differential Evaluation of Racial and Nonracial Harms
Daniel Yonas, Columbia University
Dr. Larisa Heiphetz, Columbia University

Adults’ moral judgments show sensitivity to information about intent, but it is unclear how this sensitivity may differ between Black and White adults when thinking about racial harms, where intent is often unstated. To clarify this topic, the current work investigated group differences surrounding the importance of intent in moral judgments. Black (n = 80) and White (n = 80) participants read vignettes describing a moral harm, such as following someone around a store, that a White actor inflicted on a White target (nonracial) or on a Black target (racial). Participants evaluated the actors’ behaviors (e.g., "how wrong or right is what this person did?") and indicated the extent to which intent shaped their judgments (e.g., "How important is what this person meant to do when deciding how wrong or right the behavior was?"). White, versus Black, participants placed greater emphasis on intent when evaluating racial harms; however, no group differences emerged when responding to nonracial harms or when indicating how right or wrong each type of harm was. This work integrates moral psychology and the science of inequality to clarify how group membership shapes intent-based moral judgments.