REVISION: Do Managers Tacitly Collude to Withhold Industry-Wide Bad News?
Date Posted: Feb 26, 2013
That managers would choose to withhold firm-specific bad news is not only intuitive, but supported by theory, observed disclosure patterns, and survey responses. When the bad news is industry-wide, however, explaining withholding as a sustainable equilibrium is more complicated. If any one firm chooses to disclose, the news effectively becomes public, creating incentives for other firms to disclose. Withholding is only sustainable if all firms cooperate ("tacitly collude"), which depends on thei
REVISION: The Multinational Advantage
Date Posted: Sep 29, 2012
We investigate whether foreign operations provide U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) with a competitive advantage by comparing actual firm value to an imputed value. An innovation of our study is the use of foreign firms as benchmarks to estimate the imputed value of foreign MNC operations, which controls for differences in discount rates and expected growth rates across countries. We find robust evidence that multinational networks trade at a premium relative to local firms. This result rec
New: Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation
Date Posted: Nov 02, 2011
We examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder litigation to determine whether managers’ use of optimistic language increases litigation risk. Using both general-purpose and context-specific text dictionaries to quantify tone, we find that plaintiffs target more optimistic statements in their lawsuits and that sued firms’ earnings announcements are unusually optimistic relative to other firms experiencing similar economic circumstances. These findings are consistent with optimis
New: Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting
Date Posted: Aug 31, 2011
A detailed analysis of 49 firms subject to AAERs suggests that approximately one-quarter of the misstatements meet the legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional. Because of the bias, however, in subsequent periods these firms are more likely to be in a position in which they are compelled to intentionally misstate earnings. Overconfident executives are more likely to exhibit an optimisti
REVISION: Disclosure Tone and Shareholder Litigation
Date Posted: May 07, 2011
We examine the relation between disclosure tone and shareholder litigation to determine whether managers’ use of optimistic language increases litigation risk. Using both general-purpose and context-specific text dictionaries to quantify tone, we find that plaintiffs target more optimistic statements in their lawsuits and that sued firms’ earnings announcements are unusually optimistic relative to other firms experiencing similar economic circumstances. These findings are consistent with optimis
REVISION: Executive Overconfidence and the Slippery Slope to Financial Misreporting
Date Posted: May 07, 2011
A detailed analysis of firms subject to SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) in the 1990s and 2000s suggests that approximately one-quarter are the result of an act that is consistent with legal standards of intent. In the remaining three quarters, the initial misstatement – generally an overstatement – reflects an optimistic bias that is not necessarily intentional. Because of the bias, in subsequent periods these firms are more likely to be in a position in which they are c
REVISION: The Relation Between Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Reporting: Evidence from Synthetic Leases
Date Posted: Sep 26, 2010
I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and manage the financial statements by keeping debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash-constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. Managers of firms wi
REVISION: The Relation Between Voluntary Disclosure and Financial Reporting: Evidence from Synthetic Leases
Date Posted: Dec 27, 2009
I investigate how the use and voluntary disclosure of synthetic leases is affected by incentives to defer cash outflows and keep debt off the balance sheet. I find that managers of cash-constrained firms with incentives to defer cash payments are more likely to finance asset purchases with synthetic leases. The mandated reporting for synthetic leases allows managers to avoid disclosing the financial consequences of these transactions. I find that managers of firms with incentives to use off-b
REVISION: Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation in Performance-Vested Equity Grants
Date Posted: Apr 23, 2009
Using data from FTSE 350 firms, we examine the factors influencing the explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity grants. We provide evidence on the use of RPE either to improve incentives by removing common risk or by linking greater vesting percentages to higher relative performance rankings. We also investigate whether RPE is used to opportunistically increase vesting and/or placate external parties calling for its use. We find that specific RPE
REVISION: Changes in Bonus Contracts in the Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Era
Date Posted: Apr 23, 2009
We examine whether the relation between earnings and bonuses changes after Sarbanes-Oxley. Theory predicts that, as the financial reporting system reduces the discretion allowed managers, firms will put more weight on earnings in compensation contracts to encourage effort. However, the increased risk imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley on executives may cause firms to temper this contracting outcome. We examine and find support for the joint hypothesis that the implementation of Sarbanes-Oxley and related
New: Explicit Relative Performance Evaluation in Performance-Vested Equity Grants
Date Posted: Jan 24, 2009
Using data from FTSE 350 firms, we examine factors influencing explicit relative performance evaluation (RPE) conditions in performance-vested equity grants. We provide exploratory evidence on whether the use or characteristics of RPE are associated with efforts to improve incentives by removing common risk, other economic factors discussed in the RPE literature, or external pressure to implement RPE. We find that many of these economic factors, including common risk reduction, are more closel