George Wu studies the psychology of individual, managerial, and organizational decision making; decision analysis; and cognitive biases in bargaining and negotiation. Wu's research has been published widely in a number of journals in economics, management science, and psychology, including Cognitive Psychology, the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, the Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Management Science, Psychological Science, and the Quarterly Journal of Economics.
Prior to joining the Chicago Booth faculty in 1997, Wu was on the faculty of Harvard Business School as an assistant and associate professor in the managerial economics area and then in the negotiation and decision making group. He also has worked as a lecturer at Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Prior to graduate school, Wu worked as a decision analyst at Procter & Gamble.
Wu is a a former department editor of Management Science and is on numerous other editorial boards, including Decision Analysis, Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, and Theory and Decision. He earned a bachelor's degree cum laude in applied mathematics with a concentration in decision and control in 1985, a master's degree in applied mathematics in 1987, and a PhD in decision sciences in 1991, all from Harvard.
With Nathanael Fast and Chip Heath, “Common Ground and Cultural Prominence: How Conversation Strengthens Culture,” Psychological Science (2009).
With Richard Larrick, "Claiming a large slice of a small pie: Asymmetric Disconfirmation in Negotiation," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (2007).
With Uri Gneezy and John List, "The Uncertainty Effect: When a risky prospect is valued less than its worst possible outcome," Quarterly Journal of Economics (2006).
With Cade Massey, "Detecting Regime Shifts: The Causes of Over- and Underreaction," Management Science (2005).
With Richard Gonzalez, "On the Shape of the Probability Weighting Function," Cognitive Psychology (1999).
For a listing of research publications please visit George Wu’s university library listing page
New: Comment on 'Obliquity' (by John Kay)
Date Posted: Apr 11, 2013
No abstract available.
REVISION: Learning to Detect Change
Date Posted: Feb 05, 2009
People, across a wide range of personal and professional domains, need to detect change accurately. Previous research has documented systematic shortcomings in doing so, in particular, a pattern of over- and under-reaction to indications of change, resulting from a tendency to overweight signals of change at the expense of the environment that produces the signals. This investigation considers whether this pattern persists when participants are given the opportunity to learn. We find that the pa
Detecting Regime Shifts: The Causes of Under- and Over-Reaction
Date Posted: Apr 01, 2008
Many decision makers operate in dynamic environments, in which markets, competitors, and technology change regularly. The ability to detect and respond to these regime shifts is critical for economic success. We conduct three experiments to test how effective individuals are at detecting such regime shifts. Specifically, we investigate when individuals are most likely to under-react to change and when they are most likely to over-react to it. We develop a system-neglect hypothesis: individu
New: Incorporating Behavioral Anomalies in Strategic Models
Date Posted: Jun 11, 2007
Behavioral decision researchers have documented a number of anomalies that seem to run counter to established theories of consumer behavior from microeconomics that are often at the core of analytical models in marketing. A natural question therefore is how equilibrium behavior and strategies would change if models were to incorporate these anomalies in a consistent way. In this paper we identify several important and generalizable anomalies that modelers may want to incorporate in their models.
New: Claiming a Large Slice of a Small Pie: Asymmetric Disconfirmation in Negotiation
Date Posted: Mar 10, 2006
Three studies show that negotiators consistently underestimate the size of the bargaining zone in distributive negotiations (the small pie bias) and, by implication, overestimate the share of the surplus they claim (the large slice bias). We explain the results by asymmetric disconfirmation: Negotiators with initial estimates of their counterpart's reservation price that are "inside" the bargaining zone tend to behave consistently with these estimates, which become self-fulfilling, whereas negot