New: Precautionary Corporate Liquidity
Date Posted: Feb 21, 2010
We develop a theory of corporate liquidity demand, capturing the fact that a firm's borrowing capacity depends on news on future investment profitability. In our model, bad news on future investment profitability reduces a firm's borrowing capacity and therefore increases the need for internal finance. Consequently, the firm's cash savings respond negatively to news on future profitability. This negative correlation is strongly supported by our empirical evidence using a combined data set of Com
New: Financial Frictions on Capital Allocation: A Transmission Mechanism of TFP Fluctuations
Date Posted: May 14, 2009
This paper provides a theory of financial frictions as a transmission mechanism for primitive shocks to translate into aggregate TFP fluctuations. In our model, financial frictions distort existing capital allocation across different production units, rather than investment in new capital. News shocks on future technology improvement are introduced as a device to identify TFP fluctuations originating from this mechanism. Our simulation shows that variations in financial frictions in response to
New: Growing Like China
Date Posted: Apr 02, 2009
This paper constructs a growth model that is consistent with salient features of the Chinese growth experience since 1992: high output growth, sustained returns on capital investments, extensive reallocation within the manufacturing sector, falling labor share and accumulation of a large foreign surplus. The theory makes only minimal deviations from a neoclassical growth model. Its building blocks are financial imperfections and reallocation among firms with heterogeneous productivity. Some firm
New: Markovian Social Security in Unequal Societies
Date Posted: Mar 25, 2009
In this paper, we develop a dynamic politico-economic theory of social security to address two questions. First, how is social security sustained? Second, how does inequality affect the size of social security, and can the theoretical predictions be consistent with the observed puzzling relationships between inequality and the size of social security? As a stark framework, our model economy features the absence of altruism, commitment, reputation mechanism and electoral uncertainty. We character
New: The Dynamics of Inequality and Social Security in General Equilibrium
Date Posted: Mar 24, 2009
This paper analyzes the dynamic politico-economic equilibrium of a model where repeated voting on social security and the evolution of household characteristics in general equilibrium are mutually affected over time. In particular, we incorporate within-cohort heterogeneity in a two-period Overlapping-Generation model to capture the intra-generational redistributive effect of social security transfers. Political decision-making is represented by a probabilistic voting a la Lindbeck and Weibull (
New: Persistent Ideology and the Determination of Public Policy over Time
Date Posted: Mar 24, 2009
This paper investigates how public policy responds to persistent ideological shifts in dynamic politico-economic equilibria. To this end, we develop a tractable model to analyze the dynamic interactions among public policy, individuals' intertemporal choice and the evolution of political constituency. Analytical solutions are obtained to characterize Markov perfect equilibria. Our main finding is that a right-wing ideology may increase the size of government. Data from a panel of 18 OECD countri
New: Financial Friction, Capital Reallocation and News-Driven Business Cycles
Date Posted: Jul 11, 2007
In this paper, we show that news on future technological improvement can trigger an immediate economic expansion in a model with financial friction on capital allocation. The arrivial of good news on future technology reduces such frictions and generates significant increase in current Total Factor Productivity via capital reallocation. This triggers an immediate boom in output, consumption, investment and hours worked. Our empirical evidence using firm-level data supports strongly the above mec
New: Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of
Public Expenditure and Debt.
Date Posted: Jun 28, 2007
This paper proposes a dynamic politico-economic theory of debt, government finance and expenditure. Agents have preferences over a private and a government-provided public good, financed through labor taxation. Subsequent generations of voters choose taxation, government expenditure and debt accumulation through repeated elections. Debt introduces a conflict of interest between young and old voters: the young want more fiscal discipline. We characterize the Markov Perfect Equilibrium of the dyna