Lin William Cong primarily studies corporate finance and investments. His research interests include real options, entrepreneurial finance, market efficiency, statistical learning, financial intermediation and innovation, and China's economy and financial markets. For his doctoral studies, Cong has received the Finance Theory Group Best Paper Award (runner up), the Shmuel Kandel Award, and the Zephyr Prize for Best Paper in Corporate Finance, amongst other honors and fellowships. He was also a George Shultz Scholar at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and a PhD Fellow at the Stanford Institute for Innovation in Developing Economies, with research grants from both institutes. Additionally, his undergraduate research in physics and applied mathematics resulted in publications in a variety of science journals. Cong currently referees for The American Economic Review, Review of Financial Studies, Management Science, Journal of Public Economics, Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Journal of Economic Theory, and Journal of Political Economy.
Cong earned a Ph.D. in finance and a MS in statistics from Stanford University, where he received the Gerald Lieberman Fellowship for outstanding contributions in research, teaching, and university service, and the Asian American Award for graduate leadership. He also holds dual degrees from Harvard University where he graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa in 2009 with an A.M. in physics, an A.B. in math & physics, a minor in economics, and a language citation in French.
Cong is a native of Shenyang, China. Outside his research and teaching, Cong practices Chinese Calligraphy, and enjoys reading, sports, cross fitness, guitar, as well as learning French and Japanese. Cong is also passionate about education in China and in the U.S., and integrating quantitative and fundamental approaches to investments in various asset classes, to which he coined the term "Quantimental Investing".
2015 - 2016 Course Schedule
REVISION: Auctions of Real Options
Corporations and governments frequently sell assets with embedded real options to competing buyers using both cash and contingent bids. Examples include natural resource leases, real estate, patents and licenses, and start-up firms with growth options. This paper models these auctions of real options, incorporating both endogenous auction initiation and post-auction dynamics. I find that common security bids create moral hazard and distort investment. Strategic auction timing affects auction initiation, security ranking, equilibrium bidding, and investment, and should be considered jointly with security design and seller's commitment level. Optimal auction design aligns investment incentives using a combination of down payment and royalty payment, but inefficiently delays sale and investment. I also provide suggestive evidence for model predictions using data from the leasing and exploration of oil and gas tracts. Altogether, these results reconcile theory with several empirical ...